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Gradual type systems seamlessly integrate statically-typed programs with dynamically-typed programs. The
runtime for gradual type systems can be viewed as a monitor which refines and enforces constraints to
ensure type-preservation. Gradual typing has been applied to information flow types, where information
flowmonitors are derived from gradual information flow types. However, existing work gives up the dynamic
gradual guarantee — the property that loosening the policies of a program should not cause more runtime
errors — in favor of noninterference — the key security property for information flow control systems. In this
paper, we re-examine the connection between gradual information flow types and information flowmonitors,
and identify the root cause for the tension between satisfying gradual guarantees and noninterference. We
develop a runtime semantics for a simple imperative language with gradual information flow types that
provides both noninterference and the dynamic gradual guarantee. We leverage a proof technique developed
for FlowML, which reduces noninterference proofs to preservation proofs, to prove the key security property.
1 INTRODUCTION
Static type systems can rule out problematic programs and check important properties at com-
pile time. For instance, information flow type systems label each type with a security label (e.g.,
intH to indicate a secret integer) and can ensure well-typed programs do not leak secrets to at-
tackers [Volpano et al. 1996]. However, purely statically-typed languages face significant adoption
challenges because average programmers are unfamiliar with and unwilling to use complex type
systems and much of the legacy infrastructure was written in untyped or dynamically typed lan-
guages.
Gradual typing, which aims to seamlessly integrate statically-typed programswith dynamically-
typed programs, is one promising technique to address these challenges [Siek and Taha 2006]. At
a high-level, gradual type systems introduce a dynamic type, often written as ?, to accommodate
untyped portions of the program. The type system allows any program to be typed under ?; and
the runtime semantics of gradual type systems monitor the interactions between parts typed as ?
and statically typed parts to ensure type preservation of the current execution.
Gradual typing has been applied to a number of type systems [Jafery and Dunfield 2017; Lehmann and Tanter
2017; New and Ahmed 2018; Rastogi et al. 2012, 2015; Schwerter et al. 2014], including informa-
tion flow types [Disney and Flanagan 2011; Fennell and Thiemann 2013, 2016; Toro et al. 2018],
where an expression of type int? has its information flow labels determined at runtime. As a
result, information flow monitors are derived from the runtime semantics of gradual informa-
tion flow types. Most of the prior works on gradual information flow typing have developed ad
hoc approaches relying on using programmer-annotated upgrades and casts to ensure correct-
ness [Disney and Flanagan 2011; Fennell and Thiemann 2013, 2016]. Formal properties related to
gradual typing such as dynamic gradual guarantee [Siek et al. 2015], the property that loosening
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the policies of a program should not cause more runtime errors, are not considered in those sys-
tems. Recent work aims to take a principled approach to generate runtime semantics from gradual
typing theories, in hope to achieve gradual guarantees [Toro et al. 2018]. However, they have to
give up dynamic gradual guarantee in favor of noninterference, the key security property for infor-
mation flow control systems [Goguen and Meseguer 1982], in a higher-order setting.
In this paper, we re-examine the connection between gradual information flow types and in-
formation flow monitors (c.f. Austin and Flanagan [2009, 2010]; Russo and Sabelfeld [2010]). To
identify the root cause of the tension between dynamic gradual guarantee and security, we fo-
cus on a simple imperative language with first-order functions and stores, which has been widely
used in designing information flow control systems [Hunt and Sands 2006;Moore and Chong 2011;
Russo and Sabelfeld 2010; Terauchi and Aiken 2005; Volpano et al. 1996; Volpano and Smith 1997].
We develop runtime semantics for this language with gradual information flow types that en-
joy both noninterference and the dynamic gradual guarantee. We draw ideas from abstracting
gradual typing, which advocates deriving runtime semantics for gradual types via preservation
proof [Garcia et al. 2016].
We leverage a proof technique developed for FlowML, which reduces noninterference proofs
to preservation proofs [Pottier and Simonet 2002]. The main idea here is to extend the language
with pairs of expressions and commands, representing two executions with different secrets in one
program. Noninterference follows from preservation.
The main insight is that to enforce noninterference and remove implicit flows, the runtime
semantics need to take into consideration variable writes in the untaken branch for refining infor-
mation about the imprecise labels. This is because the semantics that only gradually instantiate
information flow labels resemble a flow-sensitive monitor and therefore inherit problems with im-
plicit leaks of flow-sensitive monitors [Russo and Sabelfeld 2010]. On the other hand, too coarse-
grained guessing without using information about the untaken branch yields rigid semantics that
break gradual guarantees (More details in Section 3.4).
Our proof technique clearly illustrates the problem with flow-sensitive monitors and naturally
suggests the “hybrid” approach [Moore and Chong 2011]. More concretely, paired execution pin-
points that writing to memory inside a branch that depends on a secret results in two executions,
which produces different attacker observations and therefore cause insecurity (Section 3.4).
While the language considered in this paper is simple (no higher-order functions or stores),
it still manifests the problem that does not guarantee both noninterference and dynamic gradual
guarantee. Further,much of the dynamic information flowmonitoring literature uses this language,
from which we draw inspirations for our monitoring semantics.
This paper is organized as follows. We briefly review information flow control systems in Sec-
tion 2. Then, in Section 3, we give an overview of gradual information flow types and motivate
our work. Next, we formally define the syntax, type system, and information flow monitor se-
mantics of a simple while language (Section 4), prove that our monitor enforces noninterference
(Section 5) and satisfies gradual guarantees (Section 6). We review related work in Section 7. Due
to space constraints, the proofs of various lemmas and theorems have been included in the sup-
plementary material included with the submission. Some of the uninteresting formalism has also
been included in the supplementary material.
2 OVERVIEW OF INFORMATION FLOW CONTROL SYSTEMS
In information flow control systems, the variables are annotated with a security label that is an
element of a security lattice, i.e., the elements have a partial-ordering and a well-defined join
and meet operation. For instance, in a two-point lattice with elements {L,H } and L 4 H , L may
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: March 2020.
:3
represent low or public, and H may represent high or secret. 4 represents the partial-ordering
between elements; ℓ1 4 ℓ2 indicates that information can flow from ℓ1 to ℓ2.
Information flows can be broadly classified as explicit and implicit [Denning and Denning 1977;
Goguen and Meseguer 1982]. Explicit flows arise as a result of variable assignments. For instance,
the statement x = y + z causes an explicit flow of values in y and z to x . Implicit flows arise from
control structures in the program. For example, in the program l = false; if(h){l = true; }, there is
an implicit flow of information from h to the final value of l (it is true iff h is true). Implicit flows
are handled by maintaining a pc label (program-context label), which is an upper bound on the
labels of all the predicates that have influenced the control flow thus far. In the previous example,
the pc label inside the branch is the label of h.
Information flow control systems aim to prevent leaks through these flows by either statically
enforcing information flow typing rules and ruling out insecure programs at compile-time or dy-
namically monitoring programs and aborting the execution of insecure programs. In both systems,
assignment to a variable is disallowed if either the pc label or the join of the label of the operands
is not less than the label of the variable being assigned [Austin and Flanagan 2009; Volpano et al.
1996]. Thus, in the above examples, if either the label of y or z is greater than the label of x or
the label of h is greater than the label of l , the assignment does not type-check or the execution
aborts at runtime. This guarantees a variant of noninterference, known as termination-insensitive
noninterference [Volpano et al. 1996], which we prove for our gradual type system. We assume
that an adversary cannot observe or gain any information if a program’s execution diverges or
aborts, and can only observe “public” values output by the program.
3 GRADUAL SECURITY TYPING
Static information flow type systems do not scale up to scenarios where the security levels of
some of the variables are not known at compile-time while dynamic approaches are not amenable
to providing compile-time guarantees. Gradual typing extends the reach of type-system based
analysis by adding an imprecise security label or a dynamic label, ?, for variables whose labels are
not known at compile-time. The runtime semantics then ensures that no information is leaked due
to the relaxation of the type-system for handling variables with ? label.
3.1 Imprecise Security Label: Interpretations and Operations
The label ? is not an actual element of the security lattice and its meaning is not universally agreed
upon. Differences will manifest in the runtime monitoring semantics and proof of noninterference.
For illustration, consider a variable x of type int?. Semantically, in the literature ? has meant one
of the following. (1) x ’s label is dynamic (flow-sensitive) and can change at runtime (e.g., from ?
representing L to representing H when x is assigned a secret). (2) the set of possible labels for x
is refined at runtime and the set in a future state will be a subset of its the current state. Since we
build on top of a flow-insensitive type system, we opt for the second meaning of ?. Our runtime
monitor will keep track of the set of possible labels for x . Note that a typical flow-sensitive IFC
monitor (e.g. Austin and Flanagan [2009]; Russo and Sabelfeld [2010]) takes an approach aligned
with (1).
In the initial program state, ? could be interpreted as: (1) x could contain a secret or be observable
to an adversary. Therefore, we should treat x conservatively as if it is both secret and public. (2)
? indicates indifference; the data x contains in the initial state is of no security value; otherwise,
x should have been given the label H . We choose (2) again, as it is a cleaner interpretation. Note
that this is only for the initial state. At runtime, the monitor maintains enough state to concretely
know whether x contains a secret or not.
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1 y := falseH
2 if (x) then y := trueH
Listing 1. Example program with security types
1 y := false?
2 if (x) then y := true?
Listing 2. Program with imprecise security
types
1 y := false?
2 z := falseL
3 if (x) then y := true?
4 if (y) then z := trueL
Listing 3. Example showing refinement of
imprecise types and gradual typing
1 y := true?
2 z := trueL
3 if (x) then y := false?
4 if (y) then z := falseL
5 output(L, z)
Listing 4. Example explaining violation of
dynamic gradual guarantee
3.2 Motivating Examples of Gradually Refined Security Policy
Consider the program in Listing 1 and its variant with imprecise types in Listing 2. Suppose the
lattice contains four elements {⊥, L,H ,⊤} such that ⊥ 4 L 4 H 4 ⊤. Assume that the initial
type of x is boolL in both the examples while the type of y is boolH in Listing 1 and bool? in
Listing 2. The program in Listing 1 does not leak any information. With gradual typing, its variant
in Listing 2 is also accepted by the type system. However, if the runtime only refines the set of
possible labels for y as the program runs, the use of y in the branch on line 2 carries additional
information about what the label of y could be. With x : boolL , y could either be L,H , or ⊤, as any
of these assignments are valid as per the handling of implicit flows described above. However, if
x : boolH , then y cannot be L as that would result in an implicit flow. Thus, the possible labels of
y are refined to the set {H ,⊤} when x = true.
If the program in Listing 2 is extended with another branch as shown in Listing 3 with z : boolL ,
the branch on line 4 carries information about the refined set of possible labels for y. Thus, when
x : boolL , the possible labels for y on line 4 are {L,H ,⊤}. This allows the assignment on line 4 to
succeed as the assignment is to a variable that has a label contained in the set of possible pc labels.
When x has the type boolH , then the possible labels for y on line 4 are {H ,⊤}. This causes the
assignment on line 4 to fail as L is not in the possible set of pc labels ({H ,⊤}).
3.3 Gradual Guarantees
A desirable formal property for gradual type systems is gradual guarantee, proposed by Siek et al.
[2015]. Gradual guarantee relates programs that differ only in the precision of the type annota-
tions. It states that changes that make the annotations of a gradually typed program less precise
should not change the static or dynamic behavior of the program. In other words, if a programwith
more precise type annotations is well-typed in the static type system, and terminates in the run-
time semantics, then the same program with less precise terms is also well-typed, and terminates,
respectively.
For illustration, consider the previous example from Listing 1. Assume that the program is well-
typed under a gradual type system with x : boolH and y : boolH as secret variables, and z :
boolL as a public variable. When x is true, the branch on line 2 is taken and y is assigned the
value true and has the label H . When x is false, y remains false. This program is accepted by
the security type system and dynamic information flow monitor, and runs to completion in all
possible executions. As per the static gradual guarantee, the program should also be well-typed if,
for instance, y had an imprecise ? security level as shown in Listing 2. As per the dynamic gradual
guarantee, the program in Listing 2 should run to completion at runtime, even with the imprecise
label for y in all executions of the program.
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3.4 Implicit Flows vs. Dynamic Gradual Guarantee
The example in Listing 4 illustrates the tension between noninterference and dynamic gradual
guarantee. Assume that x : boolH is a secret variable and z : boolL is a public variable. The
security type of y is unknown at compile-time, i.e., y : bool?. Consider two runs of the program
with different initial values of x . When x is true, the branch on line 3 is taken andy is assigned the
value false with some label. As y is false, the branch on line 4 is not taken and z remains true.
When x is false, the branch on line 3 is not taken and y remains truewith the imprecise label ?.
As the pc is ? and is possible to be L, the assignment on line 4 succeeds, and z becomes false. Thus,
in the two runs of the program, different values of z are output for different values of x , thereby
leaking the value of x to the adversary. This is akin to the problemwhere dynamic information flow
monitors are not able to reason about alternate branches, which results in aborting the program
execution when the assignment on line 3 is being made (similar to the no-sensitive-upgrade check
proposed by Austin and Flanagan [2009]).
This program can be rejected by deploying a special monitoring rule that preemptively aborts an
assignment statement if there is possibility that the pc is not lower than or equal to the variable’s
label, as explained in Toro et al. [2018]. In the above example, the assignment on line 3 will be
aborted, because the pc is H , and y’s label could be ⊥ or L, which might leak information. This
ensures noninterference, but unfortunately, the extra check is not closed under policy weakening.
That is, enlarging the set of possible labels fory will cause the monitor to abort, which contradicts
the dynamic gradual guarantee.
To tackle this problem, we leverage the static phase of the gradual type system to determine the
set of variables being written to in different branches and loops, and refine their possible security
labels to get a more permissive analysis that helps us recover the dynamic gradual guarantee.
In other words, if the branch on line 2 is taken in Listing 2, we know that y will be written to,
therefore, we narrow the possibility of the labels for y to {H ,⊤} as the first step of executing the
if statement, regardless of whether x is true or false. This is very similar to how hybrid monitors
stop implicit leaks [Moore and Chong 2011; Russo and Sabelfeld 2010].We will discuss this further
in Section 4.4.
4 A LANGUAGEWITH GRADUAL INFORMATION FLOW TYPES
In this section, we first present the syntax and typing rules for our language with gradual infor-
mation flow types (WHILEG). We then extendWHILEG toWHILEG
Evd
by augmenting the syntax
with evidences for gradual labels and define the translation fromWHILEG toWHILEG
Evd
. Finally,
we present the operational semantics for our monitor that can prevent implicit leaks.
4.1 Syntax and Typing Rules forWHILEG
The syntactic constructs of WHILEG are summarized in Figure 1. Gradual types, U , consist of a
type (bool, or int) and a gradual security label, д. This label is either a static security label, denoted
ℓ; or an imprecise dynamic label, denoted ?. As is standard, ℓ is drawn from Labs, a set of labels,
which are part of a security lattice L = (Labs,4). Here4 is a partial order between labels in Labs.
We commonly use the label H to indicate secret, L to indicate public data, and L 4 H .
As is common in gradual typing, the partial-ordering (4) and join operation (g) on security
labels (ℓ) extends to consistent ordering (4 c ) and consistent-join (gc ) to account for ?, as shown
in Figure 2. The consistent subtyping relation is written as τд1 ≤ c τд2 .
A value is a raw value with a gradual label. Raw values are integer constants n, or boolean val-
ues. Expressions include values, variables, cast, and binary operations on expressions. Commands
include skip, sequencing, assignments, branches, loops, and outputs. This language does not have
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Labels ℓ ::= L | . . . |H
Raw values u ::= n | true | false
Values v ::= uд
Types τ ::= bool | int
Gradual labels д ::= ? | ℓ
Gradual types U ::= τд
Typing Context Γ ::= · | Γ, x : U
Expressions e ::= x |v | e1 bop e2 | e :: τд
Commands c ::= skip | c1; c2 | x := e | output(ℓ, e) | if e thenc1 elsec2 |while e do c
Fig. 1. Syntax for the languageWHILEG
ℓ1 4 ℓ2
ℓ1 4 c ℓ2 ? 4 c д д 4 c?
д1 4 c д2
τд1 ≤ c τ
д2
ℓ1 gc ℓ2 = ℓ1 g ℓ2
д , ⊤
? gc д = ?
д , ⊤
д gc ? = ? ? gc ⊤ = ⊤ ⊤ gc ? = ⊤
Fig. 2. Operations on gradual labels and types
Γ ⊢ e : U
Γ ⊢ bд : boolд
Bool
Γ ⊢ nд : intд
Int
Γ ⊢ x : Γ(x)
Var
Γ ⊢ e : U ′ U ′ ≤ c U
Γ ⊢ e :: U : U
Cast
∀i ∈ {1, 2}, Γ ⊢ ei : τ
дi д = д1 gc д2
Γ ⊢ e1 bop e2 : τ
д
Bop
Γ; дpc ⊢ c
Γ; дpc ⊢ skip
Skip
Γ; дpc ⊢ c1
Γ; дpc ⊢ c2
Γ; дpc ⊢ c1; c2
Seq
Γ ⊢ x : τд Γ ⊢ e : τд
дpc 4 c д
Γ; дpc ⊢ x := e
Assign
Γ ⊢ e : τд
д 4 c ℓ дpc 4 c ℓ
Γ; дpc ⊢ output(ℓ, e)
Out
Γ ⊢ e : boolд
Γ; дpc gc д ⊢ c
Γ; дpc ⊢ while e do c
While
Γ ⊢ e : boolд
Γ; дpc gc д ⊢ c1
Γ; дpc gc д ⊢ c2
Γ; дpc ⊢ if e then c1 else c2
If
Fig. 3. Typing rules forWHILEG
higher-order stores, so the left-hand side of the assignment is always a global variable. The output
command outputs a value at a fixed security label ℓ. We include this command mainly to have a
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Label-interval evidences ι ::= [ℓlow, ℓhigh]
Cast evidences E ::= (ι1, ι2)
Values v ::= (ι u)д
Variable Set X ::= {x1, . . . , xn}
Expressions e ::= x |v | e1 bop e2 | Eд e
Commands c ::= skip | c1; c2 | x := e | output(ℓ, e)
| ifX e thenc1 elsec2 |while
Xe do c
Fig. 4. Syntax for the languageWHILEG
Evd
(extends Figure 1)
clear statement of the system’s observable behavior, so we do not allow output at the imprecise
label ?.
WHILE
G has two main typing judgments. The first types an expression e at type U given a
typing context for variables: Γ ⊢ e : U . The second judgment types a command c given the typing
context Γ and a pc-label: Γ; дpc ⊢ c . The pc-label дpc is a gradual label. Typing rules for expressions
and commands are summarized in Figure 3. Var types the variables. Binary operations on expres-
sions are typed by Bop, which types the resulting expression with the join of the gradual labels.
Cast casts an expression of type τд
′
to the type τд if the two labels satisfy consistent ordering.
Note that the consistent subtyping relation is not transitive.
The rules for commands are pretty standard except that we check for the ordering of gradual
labels instead of the actual labels. Thus, both the assignment and the output rule check for the
labels of the variables to be higher than the current pc, and the label of the operands and the
channel, respectively.
4.2 WHILEG
Evd
Recall that examples in Section 2 use a set of possible security labels for preventing information
leaks. These are evidences attesting to the validity of gradual labels. We use an interval of labels,
representing the least and the highest possible label, instead of tracking all possible labels as the
refinement only narrows the interval of labels, similar to [Toro et al. 2018].
There are two types of evidences–one is a label-interval, ι, that justifies the imprecise dynamic la-
bel ?; and a pair of intervals or the cast-evidence, E = (ι1, ι2) that justifies the consistent-subtyping
relation between gradual types for casting an expression from one type to another. Intuitively, ι
represents the range of possible static labels that would allow the program to type-check. For static
labels ℓ, the evidence is given as [ℓ, ℓ]. An interval [ℓl , ℓr ] is valid iff ℓl 4 ℓr . In rest of the paper, we
consider only those intervals that are valid. Any operation leading to invalid intervals is aborted
or leads to divergence.
The syntax of WHILEG
Evd
is shown in Figure 4. A value in WHILEG
Evd
is a raw value with an
interval of possible security labels with the gradual label. An explicit type cast is written Eд e ,
where E is the evidence justifying the type cast and д is the label of the resulting type. The assign-
ment command includes the label-interval of the expression to be written while the label-interval
in the output command is that of the output expression. Both if and while commands include a
label-interval, which is the initial evidence of their respective predicates. To prevent implicit leaks,
we include a write-set of variables, X , which takes into account variable writes in both conditional
branches and the loop body.
Label-interval operations.We first define functions and operations on the label-intervals that
are used by the typing rules and semantics (shown in Figure 5). The function γ (д) returns the
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γ (?) = [⊥,⊤] γ (ℓ) = [ℓ, ℓ]
ℓl 4 ℓr
valid([ℓl , ℓr ])
ι1 = [ℓ1, ℓ
′
1] ι2 = [ℓ2, ℓ
′
2]
ℓ2 4 ℓ1 ℓ
′
1 4 ℓ
′
2
ι1 ⊑ ι2
ι1 = [ℓ1, ℓ
′
1] ι2 = [ℓ2, ℓ
′
2]
ℓ
′
1 4 ℓ2
ι1 4 ι2
ι1 = [ℓ1l , ℓ1r ] ι2 = [ℓ2l , ℓ2r ] ℓ1l 4 ℓ1r uprise ℓ2r ℓ2l g ℓ1l 4 ℓ2r
refine(ι1, ι2) = ([ℓ1l , ℓ1r uprise ℓ2r ], [ℓ2l g ℓ1l , ℓ2r ])
ι1 = [ℓ1l , ℓ1r ] ι2 = [ℓ2l , ℓ2r ] (ℓ1l $ ℓ1r uprise ℓ2r ) ∨ (ℓ2l g ℓ1l $ ℓ2r )
refine(ι1, ι2) = undef
ι1 = [ℓ1, ℓ
′
1] ι2 = [ℓ2, ℓ
′
2]
ι1 g ι2 = [ℓ1 g ℓ2, ℓ
′
1 g ℓ
′
2]
ι1 ⊑ γ (д1) ι2 ⊑ γ (д2) д1 4 c д2
(ι1, ι2) ⊢ τ
д1 ≤ c τ
д2
Fig. 5. Label and label-interval operations
maximum possible label-interval for the gradual-label д, assuming ⊥ and ⊤ are the least and the
greatest element in the lattice, respectively. Label-intervals form a lattice with the partial order-
ing defined as ι1 ⊑ ι2. Here, ι1 is said to be more precise than ι2. The label-intervals are refined
throughout the execution of the program; i.e., getting more precise. For illustration, consider the
example in Listing 3. Assume that the security lattice contains two elements L and H such that
L 4 H . Initially, y has a label ? with the evidence [L,H ] indicating that any of the two labels are
possible. If x : boolH , then the only possible label of y that allows assignment on line 3 is H . Thus,
the evidence of the label of y is refined to [H ,H ], which makes the program-context’s evidence on
line 4 [H ,H ] disallowing assignments to L-labeled variables.
We define ι1 4 ι2 to mean for every security label in ι1, there is a label in ι2, higher or in equal
position in the security lattice; and for every security label in ι2, there is a label in ι1, lower or in
equal position in the security lattice. Even though we do not use the relation directly in our typing
rules or semantics, this is an invariant that must hold on the results of a set of the binary label-
interval operations, necessitated by the noninterference proofs. The function refine(ι1, ι2) returns
the largest sub-intervals of ι1 and ι2, ι′1 and ι
′
2, respectively, such that ι
′
1 4 ι
′
2. If the relation does
not hold between ι′1 and ι
′
2, the function returns undef to abort the execution.
The join of label-intervals is defined as ι1 g ι2. Note that this is not to be confused with the
join operation in the lattice that the intervals form. The join of the label-intervals computes the
interval corresponding to all possible joins of security labels in those intervals.
Evidence-based consistent subtyping. Next, we define consistent subtyping relations for both
gradual labels and types as supported by label-intervals. The consistent subtyping relation between
two gradual types is written as (ι1, ι2) ⊢ τд1 ≤ c τд2 (defined in Figure 5). In the relation, ι1, resp. ι2
represents the set of possible labels for д1, resp. д2, and д1 4 c д2. The evidence (ι1, ι2) is to justify
the consistent security label partial ordering relation between the labels of the gradual types. Note
that we do not have ι1 4 ι2 in the premise. The reason is that (ι1, ι2) ⊢ τд1 ≤ c τд2 is used to type
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Γ ⊢ e : U
ι ⊑ γ (д)
Γ ⊢ (ι b)д : boolд
G-Bool
ι ⊑ γ (д)
Γ ⊢ (ι n)д : intд
G-Int
Γ ⊢ x : Γ(x)
G-Var
∀i ∈ {1, 2}, Γ ⊢ ei : τ
дi д = д1 gc д2
Γ ⊢ e1 bop e2 : τ
д
G-Bop
Γ ⊢ e : τд1 E ⊢ τд1 ≤ c τ
д
Γ ⊢ Eд e : τд
G-Cast
Γ; ιpc дpc ⊢ c
Γ; ιpc дpc ⊢ skip
G-Skip
Γ; ιpc дpc ⊢ c1
Γ; ιpc дpc ⊢ c2
Γ; ιpc дpc ⊢ c1; c2
G-Seq
Γ ⊢ x : τд Γ ⊢ e : τд
ιpc ⊑ γ (дpc) дpc 4 c д
Γ; ιpc дpc ⊢ x := e
G-Assign
Γ ⊢ e : τд д 4 c ℓ
ιpc ⊑ γ (дpc) дpc 4 c ℓ
Γ; ιpc дpc ⊢ output(ℓ, e)
G-Out
Γ ⊢ e : boolд X = WtSet(c)
ιc = γ (д) Γ; ιpc g ιc дpc gc д ⊢ c
Γ; ιpc дpc ⊢ while
X e do c
G-While
Γ ⊢ e : boolд ιc = γ (д)
X = WtSet(c1) ∪WtSet(c2) ∀i = {1, 2}, Γ; ιpc g ιc дpc gc д ⊢ ci
Γ; ιpc дpc ⊢ if
X e then c1 else c2
G-If
Fig. 6. Typing rules forWHILEG
Evd
runtime terms; even though ι1 4 ι2 holds initially, as label-intervals are refined from ιi to ι′i , we
cannot guarantee that ι′1 4 ι
′
2 hold. This will break preservation proofs. It is not the gradual type
system’s job to ensure all execution paths are secure. Instead, the runtime semantics will refine
the intervals and abort the computation if necessary when a term is evaluated.
Typing rules for WHILEG
Evd
. Typing rules for expressions and commands with evidences are
summarized in Figure 6. G-Cast allows assigning an expression of typeU1 the typeU2 if the cast-
evidence E shows thatU1 is a consistent sub-type of U2.
We augment the command typing with an interval for the gradual pc label; ιpc is the range of
possible static labels for theдpc . The rules are similar to the ones in the original type-system except
for the use of evidence for consistent ordering between the gradual labels. A notable exception is
the use ofWtSet(c) that returns the set of variables being updated or assigned to in the command
c . The definition for WtSet is a straightforward inductive definition over the structure of c and is
shown in the supplementary material.
4.3 FromWHILEG toWHILEG
Evd
Figure 7 shows the rules for translating expressions and commands in WHILEG to WHILEG
Evd
with evidence insertion. T-Bool and T-Int augment a raw value with an initial label-interval
based on their gradual label. T-Cast inserts a cast-evidence that justifies the ordering between
the gradual labels of the old and new type. T-Bool and T-Seq inductively define the translation
on sub-expressions and sub-commands. The rules T-Assign and T-Out annotate the respective
operations with a label-interval, which represents the set of possible labels based on the gradual
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label of the expression to be assigned or output, while T-If and T-While augment the respective
commands with the interval corresponding to the gradual labels of their respective predicates. Ad-
ditionally, they insert a write-set X that includes the set of all variables that might be written to
in both the branches and the loop body.
We prove the following theorem stating that any well-typed term inWHILEG can be translated
to another well-typed term inWHILEG
Evd
. The proof is included in the supplementary material.
Theorem 1. If Γ;дpc ⊢ c and Γ;дpc ⊢ c { c ′, then ∀ιpc ⊑ γ (дpc), Γ; ιpc дpc ⊢ c ′.
4.4 Operational Semantics
Runtime constructs. We first define additional runtime constructs for our semantics, shown
below. The store, δ , maps variables to values with their gradual labels and intervals. The gradual-
labels of the variables are suffixed on the values for the purpose of evaluation.
Store δ ::= · | δ , x 7→ v
PC Stack κ ::= ∅ | (ιpc дpc) |κ1 ⊲ κ2
Actions α ::= · | (ℓ,v)
Commands c ::= · · · | {c} | if e thenc1 elsec2
Eval. Ctx. C ::= [ ] | E [ ] | [ ] bop e |v bop [ ]
| x := [ ] | output(ℓ, [ ]) | if[ ] thenc1 elsec2
Γ ⊢ e { e ′ : U
ι = γ (д)
Γ ⊢ bд { (ι b)д : boolд
T-Bool
ι = γ (д)
Γ ⊢ nд { (ι n)д : intд
T-Int
Γ(x) = τд
Γ ⊢ x { x : τд
T-Var
∀i ∈ {1, 2}, Γ ⊢ ei { e
′
i : τ
дi
д = д1 gc д2
Γ ⊢ e1 bop e2 { e
′
1 bop e
′
2 : τ
д
T-Bop
Γ ⊢ e { e ′ : τд1
д1 4 c д (ι1, ι2) = refine(γ (д1),γ (д))
Γ ⊢ (e :: τд){ (ι1, ι2)
д e ′ : τд
T-Cast
Γ; дpc ⊢ c { c ′
Γ; дpc ⊢ skip{ skip
T-Skip
Γ; дpc ⊢ c1 { c
′
1 Γ; дpc ⊢ c2 { c
′
2
Γ; дpc ⊢ c1; c2 { c
′
1; c
′
2
T-Seq
Γ(x) = τд Γ ⊢ e { e ′ : τд
Γ; дpc ⊢ x := e { x := e
′
T-Assign
Γ ⊢ e { e ′ : τд
Γ; дpc ⊢ output(ℓ, e){ output(ℓ, e
′)
T-Out
Γ ⊢ e { e ′ : boolд Γ; дpc gc д ⊢ c { c
′ X = WtSet(c ′)
Γ; дpc ⊢ while e do c { while
X e ′ do c ′
T-While
Γ ⊢ e { e ′ : boolд
Γ; дpc gc д ⊢ c1 { c
′
1 Γ; дpc gc д ⊢ c2 { c
′
2 X = WtSet(c
′
1) ∪WtSet(c
′
2)
Γ; дpc ⊢ if e then c1 else c2 { if
X e ′ then c ′1 else c
′
2
T-If
Fig. 7. Translation fromWHILEG toWHILEG
Evd
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ι1 = [ℓ1l , ℓ1r ] ι2 = [ℓ2l , ℓ2r ]
ι1 ⊲⊳ ι2 = [ℓ1l g ℓ2l , ℓ1r uprise ℓ2r ]
ι′′ = (ι′ ⊲⊳ ι) ι′′ ⊑ γ (д)
ι′ ⊲⊳ (ι u)д = (ι′′ u)д
refine(ι1 ⊲⊳ ι, ι2) = (ι
′
1, ι
′
2)
ι ⊲⊳ (ι1, ι2) = ι
′
2
refine(ι1 ⊲⊳ ι, ι2) = undef
ι ⊲⊳ (ι1, ι2) = undef
Fig. 8. Runtime operations on intervals
δ / e ⇓ v
δ / (ι u)д ⇓ (ι u)д
M-Const
δ / x ⇓ δ (x)
M-Var
∀i ∈ {1, 2}, δ / ei ⇓ (ιi ui )
дi ι = ι1 g ι2 д = д1 gc д2 u = u1 bop u2
δ / e1 bop e2 ⇓ (ι u)
д
M-Bop
δ / e ⇓ (ι u)д ι′ = ι ⊲⊳ E
δ / Eд
′
e ⇓ (ι′ u)д
′ M-Cast
δ / e ⇓ (ι u)д ι ⊲⊳ E = undef
δ / Eд
′
e ⇓ abort
M-Cast-Err
δ / e ⇓ e ′
δ / C[e] ⇓ C[e ′]
M-Ctx
δ / e ⇓ abort
δ / C[e] ⇓ abort
M-Ctx-Err
Fig. 9. Monitor semantics for expressions
κ is a stack of pc labels, each of which is a gradual label, дpc , with the corresponding interval, ιpc .
The stack is used for evaluating nested if statements. The operation κ1 ⊲κ2 indicates that κ1 is on
top of κ2 in the stack. α is an action, which may be silent or a labeled output. We add two runtime
commands. {c} is used in evaluating if statements. The curly braces help the monitor to keep track
of the scope of a branch. The if statement without the write set is used in an intermediate state for
evaluating an if statement. We also define an evaluation context, which is standard.
Additional label operations. The function intvl (v) returns the label-interval of v . Formally:
intvl ((ι u)д) = ι. Figure 8 defines operations on label-intervals used by the semantics. ι1 ⊲⊳ ι2
computes the intersection of the intervals ι1 and ι2. ι′ ⊲⊳ (ι u)д merges the labels for a value.
ι ⊲⊳ (ι1, ι2) refines ι2 based on the intersection of ι and ι1.
Expressionmonitoring semantics.Our monitoring semantics for expressions is of the form δ /
e ⇓ e ′. Figure 9 presents key rules. Aswe mentioned before, when any of the interval computations
fails to produce valid intervals, the monitor aborts the computation. Rules M-Const, and M-Var
are standard. To perform a binary operation on two values, the operation is performed on the raw
values, and the join of their associated intervals and gradual labels is assigned to the computed
value.M-Cast refines a raw value’s interval according to the cast-evidence. If the refinement is not
valid, the execution aborts (M-Cast-Err). Note that none of these operations modify the gradual
label of the variable (the type of store locations remain the same); the operations only refine the
intervals of the gradual label.
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κ, δ / c
α
−→ κ ′, δ ′ / c ′
κ, δ / c1
α
−→ κ ′, δ ′ / c ′1
κ, δ / c1; c2
α
−→ κ ′, δ ′ / c ′1; c2
M-Seq
κ, δ / c
α
−→ κ ′, δ ′ / c ′
κ ⊲ ιpc дpc, δ / {c}
α
−→ κ ′ ⊲ ιpc дpc, δ
′ / {c ′}
M-Pc
ιpc дpc ⊲ κ, δ / {skip} −→ κ, δ / skip
M-Pop
κ, δ / skip; c −→ κ, δ / c
M-Skip
δ / e ⇓ v v ′ = refineUB(ιpc,v) v
′′
= refineLB(v ′, intvl (δ (x))
ιpc дpc, δ / x := e −→ ιpc дpc, δ [x 7→ v
′′] / skip
M-Assign
δ / e ⇓ v v ′ = refineLB(v, [ℓ, ℓ]) v1 = refineUB(ιpc,v
′)
ιpc дpc, δ / output(ℓ, e)
(ℓ,v1)
−→ ιpc дpc , δ / skip
M-Out
ι′pc = ιpc g ι д
′
pc = дpc gc д ci = c1 if b = true ci = c2 if b = false
ιpc дpc, δ / if (ι b)
д then c1 else c2 −→ ι
′
pc д
′
pc ⊲ ιpc дpc , δ / {ci }
M-If
δ / e ⇓ v δ ′ = refineWSet(δ ,X , ιpc,v)
ιpc дpc , δ / if
X e then c1 else c2 −→ ιpc дpc, δ
′ / if v then c1 else c2
M-If-Refine
ιpc дpc , δ / while
X e do c −→ ιpc дpc, δ / if
X e then (c;whileX e do c) else skip
M-While
δ / e ⇓ e ′
κ, δ / C[e] −→ κ, δ / C[e ′]
M-Ctx-C
δ / e ⇓ abort
κ, δ / C[e] −→ abort
M-Ctx-C-Err
κ, δ / c1 −→ abort
κ, δ / c1; c2 −→ abort
M-Seq-Err
δ / e ⇓ v refineWSet(δ ,X , ιpc,v) = undef
ιpc дpc , δ / if
X e then c1 else c2 −→ abort
M-If-Refine-Err
δ / e ⇓ v v ′ = refineUB(ιpc,v)
(v ′ = undef or refineLB(v ′, intvl (δ (x)) = undef))
ιpc дpc, δ / x := e −→ abort
M-Assign-Err
δ / e ⇓ v v ′ = refineLB(v,γ (ℓ))
(v ′ = undef or refineUB(ιpc,v
′) = undef)
ιpc дpc , δ / output(ℓ, e) −→ abort
M-Out-Err
Fig. 10. Monitor semantics for commands
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refine(ιc , ι) = (_, ι
′)
refineUB(ιc , (ι u)
д) = (ι′ u)д
refine(ιc , ι) = undef
refineUB(ιc , (ι u)
д) = undef
refine(ι, ιc ) = (ι
′
, _)
refineLB((ι u)д, ιc ) = (ι
′ u)д
refine(ι, ιc ) = undef
refineLB((ι u)д, ιc ) = undef rfL(δ , ·, ι) = δ
δ ′ = rfL(δ ,X , ι) v ′ = refineUB(ι,v) , undef
rfL((δ , x 7→ v), (X , x), ι) = δ ′, x 7→ v ′
refineUB(ι,v) = undef
rfL((δ , x 7→ v), (X , x), ι) = undef
ι′ = ιpc g ι δ
′
= rfL(δ ,X , ι′)
refineWSet(δ ,X , ιpc, (ι u)
д) = δ ′
ι′ = ιpc g ι rfL(δ ,X , ι
′) = undef
refineWSet(δ ,X , ιpc, (ι u)
д) = undef
Fig. 11. Label-interval refinement operations for the monitor
Commandsmonitoring semantics. Our monitoring semantics for commands is summarized in
Figure 10 and has the form κ, δ / c
α
−→ κ ′, δ ′ / c ′. Rules M-Seq, and M-Seq-Err, and M-Skip are
standard. RulesM-Pc andM-Popmanage commands running in branches or loops.M-Pop pops the
top-most pc-label from the stack, indicating the end of the branch or loop. We use braces around
a command, {c} to indicate that c is executing in a branch or loop. Such a command is run taking
into account only the specific branch’s pc-stack.When the command execution finishes, the braces
are removed and the current pc-label is popped off the stack.
The assignment ruleM-Assign updates the label-interval of the value being assigned according
to the assignment’s context. The resulting interval is compared against the current pc, as well as
the existing label-interval of the variable, to ensure that the assignment does not leak information.
The interval operations can be found in Figure 11. The functions refineUB and refineLB refine a
value’s label-interval to its greatest and least sub-interval based on the interval ιc . If either of these
functions return an invalid interval, the execution aborts (M-Assign-Err).
We explain the assignment rule via examples. Consider a three-point lattice L 4 M 4 H , the
following command x := [H ,H ] 5?, and two stores δ1 = x 7→ [M ,H ] 1? and δ2 = x 7→ [L,M] 2?.
Assume the following current pc interval ιpc = [L,H ]. Here, v = [H ,H ] 5?. The second premise
further refines the interval of v to make sure that the pc context is lower than or equal to the
interval of the value to be written. This is to prevent low assignment in a high context. For this
example, refine([L,H ], [H ,H ]) = ([L,H ], [H ,H ]), so the intervals remain the same. Finally, we use
the refined interval of the variable. This is to prevent storing a secret value to a low variable, but
allow storing public data to a variable that holds secret. For δ1, v ′′ = [H ,H ] 5?, so now x stores a
secret value with label H . For store δ2, refine([H ,H ], [L,M]) is not defined and the monitor aborts.
Here, we prevent a secret from being written to a low variable. As we mentioned in Section 3.1,
we do not taint the variable (allow [H ,H ] 5? to be written to x ), as this is in contradiction with the
fixed-label type system that we base our system on.M-Out makes similar comparisons to ensure
that the output is permitted.
RuleM-If is standard. The pc-label is determined by joining the current pcwith the gradual label
and interval of the branch-predicate’s value. Here, the pc-stack grows and the branch is placed in
the scoping braces. The rule for while reduces it to if. RuleM-If-Refine is the key for preventing
implicit leaks. We refine the intervals for variables in both branches according to the write set, X ,
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which contains the set of all variables being updated in either one of the two branches. Figure 11
includes the auxiliary definitions for refining the intervals of variables in a write-set. The function
rfL refines the label-interval of values in the store and is defined inductively while the function
refineWSet refine the intervals of the variables in the write-set to be at least as high as the lower
label in the interval of the current pc. We show how this prevents implicit leaks using the classic
example shown in Listing 4. When the functions rfL or refineWSet return undef, the execution
aborts. We omit the rules that transition to abort in the semantics defined further in the paper for
clarity, and can be found in the supplementary material.
Example Below, we define two initial memories, δt maps x to true and δf maps x to false. Both y
and z store true initially with y’s label being ? and z being L.
δy = y 7→ [L,H ]true
?
δz = z 7→ [L, L]true
L
δt = x 7→ [H ,H ]true
H
δf = x 7→ [H ,H ]false
H
c1 = if
{y } x then y := [L,H ]false? else skip
c2 = if
{z } y then z := [L, L]falseL else skip
Below is the execution starting from the state where x stores true.
[L, L] L, (δt , δz , δy ) / c1; c2
−→ [L, L] L, (δt , δz ,y 7→ [H ,H ]true
?) / if x then y := [L,H ]false? else skip; c2
−→ [H ,H ] H ⊲ [L, L] L, (δt , δz ,y 7→ [H ,H ]true
?) / {y := [L,H ]false?}; c2
−→ [H ,H ] H ⊲ [L, L] L, (δt , δz ,y 7→ [H ,H ]false
?) / {skip}; c2
−→ [H ,H ] H ⊲ [L, L] L, (δt , δz ,y 7→ [H ,H ]false
?) / skip; c2
−→ [L, L] L, (δt , δz ,y 7→ [H ,H ]false
?) / c2
−→ abort
In the last step, refineWSet fails, because the operation refine([H ,H ], [L, L]) produces an invalid
label-interval.
Now let’s see the execution starting from the state where x stores false.
[L, L] L, (δf , δz , δy ) / c1; c2
−→ [L, L] L, (δf , δz ,y 7→ [H ,H ]true
?) / if x then y := [L,H ]false? else skip; c2
−→ [H ,H ] H ⊲ [L, L] L, (δf , δz ,y 7→ [H ,H ]true
?) / {skip}; c2
−→ [H ,H ] H ⊲ [L, L] L, (δf , δz ,y 7→ [H ,H ]true
?) / skip; c2
−→ [L, L] L, (δf , δz ,y 7→ [H ,H ]true
?) / c2
−→ abort
Notice that the label of y is changed the same way as when we start the execution from δt . Ulti-
mately, the program aborts for the same reason.
5 NONINTERFERENCE
To prove noninterference, we extend our language to include pairs of values, expressions, and
commands to simulate running two executions simultaneously which differ on secret values. This
allows us to reduce our noninterference proof to a preservation proof [Pottier and Simonet 2002].
5.1 Paired Execution
Syntax. The augmented syntax with pairs is shown below. The store δ is extended to contain
pairs of values. We also extend commands to be paired but do not allow pairs to be nested—an
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invariant maintained by our operational semantics. We only use pairs for values and commands
whose values and effects are not observable by the adversary (are “high” in other words).
Values v ::= (ι u)д | 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉д
Cmd. c ::= · · · | 〈κ1, ι1, c1 | κ2, ι2, c2〉д
Pairs of commands are part of the runtime statement, generated as a result of evaluating a branch-
ing statement. Each command represents an independent execution, capable of changing its own
pc-stack. As a result, we include local pc-stacks in the pair with each command. The rationale
behind additional pc-stacks in command pairs is explained with the semantics.
Label-interval operations on pairs. The interval of a paired value is a pair of intervals while
the intersection of an interval and a paired value is defined as ι ⊲⊳ 〈ι1 u1 | ι1 u1〉д .
intvl (〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉
д) = 〈ι1 | ι2〉 ι ⊲⊳ 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉
д
= 〈ι ⊲⊳ ι1 u1 | ι ⊲⊳ ι2 u2〉
д
Other extensions to label-interval operations can be found in the supplementary material.
Memory read and update operations. As we allow the intervals of values to be refined, the
store read (rd) and update (upd) operations for paired values are a little involved, as shown in
Figure 12. updi vo vn takes the value currently stored at a location as the first argument, the value
to be written to that location as the second argument and returns an updated value that will be
written to that location. The complication comes when i is 1 or 2, i.e., when only one execution is
updating the value. This function needs to make sure that the correct paired value is stored. The
updi operation does not take pairs as new-values, as these operations occur only in a specific run
after branching. We will give concrete examples when we explain the semantics for assignment.
Operational semantics for pairs. The operational semantics rules are augmented with an index,
i . The judgments now are of the form δ /i e ⇓ e ′ and κ, δ /i c −→ κ ′, δ ′ /i c ′. The index i indicates
which branch of a pair is executing (when i ∈ {1, 2}) or if it is a top-level execution (when i
is omitted). Most of the rules can be directly obtained by adding the i to the monitor semantics
shown in Figures 9 and 10. Rules that deal with pairs, including read and write to the store need
to be modified. We explain important rule changes (shown in Figures 13 and 14).
Rule P-Var uses the function rdi v to retrieve the value indexed by i within v . For example,
x 7→ 〈v1 |v2〉 /i x ⇓ vi when i ∈ {1, 2}, and x 7→ 〈v1 |v2〉 / x ⇓ 〈v1 |v2〉. To evaluate a cast over a
pair of values, we push the cast inside the pair (P-Cast).
Each command in the pair (P-C-Pair) can make progress independently and the premise of the
rule is indexed by the corresponding i . Here κi is the pc-stack specific to ci . Consider a command
c = 〈c1 | c2〉, where both c1 and c2 have nested if statements. The execution of c will create different
κ1 andκ2 when executingc1 and c2. Next, ιi is the pc-label-interval demonstrating that c is supposed
to execute in a “high” context (unobservable by the adversary). The bottom pc in the stack is joined
with ιi . We will come back to this point when explaining the typing rules.
Rule P-Lift-If lifts the pair that appears as branch conditions to generate a paired command.
The resulting commands on each side of the pair are determined by the value in the corresponding
side of the branch condition. The branching context ιi is the runtime interval of the branching
condition. Initial local pc-stack is empty.
1 if aH then
2 if bH then
3 yH := 1H
4 else skip
5 else yH := 2H
Listing 5. Example program
to explain branching on
pairs
Note that the individual branches do not contain pair of com-
mands. To see how the semantics prevents nesting of command
pairs and how paired execution represents tow runs with different
secrets, consider the program in Listing 5.
The only rule that generates paired command is P-Lift-If. As-
sume that a and b are variables containing paired-values such that
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Value and interval projections:
⌊〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉
д⌋i = (ιi ui )
д ⌊(ι u)д⌋i = (ι u)
д ⌊〈ι1 | ι2〉⌋i = ιi ⌊ι⌋i = ι where i = {1, 2}
Read operations:
rd v = v rd1 v = ⌊v⌋1 rd2 v = ⌊v⌋2
Write operations:
intvl (vo) = 〈ι1 | ι2〉 or vn = 〈v1 |v2〉
∀i ∈ 1, 2, ⌊vn⌋i = (ι
′
i ui )
д ⌊intvl (vo)⌋i = ιi
refine(ι′i , ιi ) = (_, ι
′′
i )
upd vo vn = 〈ι
′′
1 u1 | ι
′′
2 u2〉
д
refine(ιn, ιo) = (_, ι
′
o)
upd (ιo uo)
д (ιn un)
д
= (ι′o un)
д
⌊intvl (vo)⌋1 = ιo lab(vo) = д
refine(ιn, ιo) = (_, ι
′
o) ⌊vo⌋2 = (ι2 u2)
д
upd1 vo (ιn un)
д
= 〈ι′o un | ι2 u2〉
д
⌊intvl (vo)⌋2 = ιo lab(vo) = д
refine(ιn, ιo) = (_, ι
′
o) ⌊vo⌋1 = (ι1 u1)
д
upd2 vo (ιn un)
д
= 〈ι1 u1 | ι
′
o un〉
д
Binary operations:
v1 = 〈ι1 u1 | ι
′
1 u
′
1〉
д1
v2 = 〈ι2 u2 | ι
′
2 u
′
2〉
д2
ι = (ι1 g ι2) ι
′
= (ι′1 g ι
′
2)
u = (u1 bop u2)
u ′ = (u ′1 bop u
′
2)
д = д1 gc д2
v = 〈ι u | ι′ u ′〉д
v1 bop v2 = v
vi = 〈ιi ui | ι
′
i u
′
i 〉
дi
vj = (ι j uj )
дj
ι = (ιi g ι j ) ι
′
= (ι′i g ι j )
u = (ui bop uj )
u ′ = (u ′i bop uj )
д = дi gc дj {i, j} = {1, 2}
v = 〈ι u | ι′ u ′〉д
v1 bop v2 = v
v1 = (ι1 u1)
д1
v2 = (ι2 u2)
д2
ι = (ι1 g ι2)
u = (u1 bop u2)
д = д1 gc д2
v = (ι u)д
v1 bop v2 = v
Cast:
v = (ι u)д ι′ = ι ⊲⊳ E
(E,д′) ⊲v = (ι′ u)д
′
v = 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉
д
∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ι′i = ιi ⊲⊳ E
(E,д′) ⊲v = 〈ι′1 u1 | ι
′
2 u2〉
д′
Fig. 12. Operations with pairs (the rules for error conditions are included in the supplementary
material)
Expression Semantics: δ /i e ⇓ v
δ /i (ι u)
д ⇓ (ι u)д
P-Const
δ /i x ⇓ rdi δ (x)
P-Var
δ /i e ⇓ v v
′
= (E,д) ⊲ v
δ /i E
д e ⇓ v ′
P-Cast
δ /i e1 ⇓ v1 δ /i e2 ⇓ v2
δ /i e1 bop e2 ⇓ v1 bop v2
P-Bop
Fig. 13. Operational semantics for expression evaluation in paired executions
a = 〈u1 |u2〉
H and b = 〈u3 |u4〉H , meaning both a and b contain
secrets and u1 and u3 are values for the first execution and u2 and
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Command Semantics: κ, δ /i c
α
−→ κ ′, δ ′ /i c
′
κi ⊲ ιpc g ιi дpc gc д, δ /i ci
α
−→ κ ′i ⊲ ιpc g ιi дpc gc д, δ
′ /i c
′
i
c j = c
′
j κj = κ
′
j {i, j} = {1, 2}
ιpc дpc, δ / 〈κ1, ι1, c1 | κ2, ι2, c2〉д
α
−→ ιpc дpc, δ
′ / 〈κ ′1, ι1, c
′
1 | κ
′
2, ι2, c
′
2〉д
P-C-Pair
i = {1, 2} c j = c1 if u1 = true
c j = c2 if u1 = false ck = c1 if u2 = true ck = c2 if u2 = false
ιpc дpc, δ / if 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉
д then c1 else c2 −→ ιpc дpc , δ / 〈∅, ι1, c j | ∅, ι2, ck 〉д
P-Lift-If
ιpc дpc , δ / 〈∅, ι1, skip | ∅, ι2, skip〉д −→ ιpc дpc, δ / skip
P-Skip-Pair
δ /i e ⇓ v v
′
= refineUB(ιpc,v)
ιpc дpc, δ /i x := e −→ ιpc дpc , δ [x 7→ updi δ (x) v
′] /i skip
P-Assign
κ, δ /i c1
α
−→ κ ′, δ ′ /i c
′
1
κ, δ /i c1; c2
α
−→ κ ′, δ ′ /i c
′
1; c2
P-Seq
κ, δ /i c
α
−→ κ ′, δ ′ /i c
′
κ ⊲ ιpc дpc, δ /i {c}
α
−→ κ ′ ⊲ ιpc дpc , δ
′ /i {c
′}
P-Pc
ι д ⊲ κ, δ /i {skip} −→ κ, δ /i skip
P-Pop
κ, δ /i skip; c −→ κ, δ /i c
P-Skip
δ /i e ⇓ v δ
′
= refineWSeti (δ ,X , ιpc,v)
ιpc дpc, δ /i if
X e then c1 else c2 −→ ιpc дpc, δ
′ /i if v then c1 else c2
P-If-Refine
δ /i e ⇓ v v
′
= refineLB(v, [ℓ, ℓ]) v1 = refineUB(ιpc,v
′)
ιpc дpc , δ /i output(ℓ, e)
(i, ℓ,v1)
−→ ιpc дpc , δ /i skip
P-Out
ι′pc = ιpc g ι д
′
pc = дpc gc д
c j = c1 if b = true c j = c2 if b = false
ιpc дpc , δ /i if (ι b)
д then c1 else c2 −→ ι
′
pc д
′
pc ⊲ ιpc дpc , δ /i {c j }
P-If
ιpc дpc, δ /i while
X e do c −→ ιpc дpc, δ /i if
X e then (c;whileX e do c) else skip
P-While
Fig. 14. Operational semantics for paired executions (the rules that result in an “abort” or diverge are
included in the supplementary material)
u4 are for the second. We ignore the intervals in this example for
simplicity of exposition. On line 1, we use the P-Lift-If rule since
we branch on a pair of values to create paired commands. In the
first execution, if u1 = true, we take the then branch. When evaluating b inside the branch we
take the first part of the pair using the expression-evaluation rules and rdi operation (Figure 12)
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for i = 1, i.e., rd1 b = ⌊b⌋1 = u3. Thus, the branch on line 2 becomes: if u3 then . . . while the
remaining parts remain the same. Similarly in the second execution, based on the value of u2, ei-
ther the then branch or the else branch is chosen. If the then branch is chosen, the branch on
line 2 becomes if u4 then . . . as we are in the second execution of the branch (i = 2) on line 1 and
rd2 b = ⌊b⌋2 = u4. It is enough to generate two different runs of the program for reasoning about
noninterference, which is what the projection semantics do.
Local pc refinements in pairs are forgotten when both sides of the pair finish executing in P-
Skip-Pair. This is similar to the P-Pop rule where the pc for the branch or loop is forgotten.
Rule P-Assign deals with the complexity of pairs updating the store in one branch with the
helper function updi vo vn (defined in Figure 12). The refinement of labels of store updates is
the same as the monitor semantics. When the update comes from a specific branch of execution
(i ∈ {1, 2}), the value for the other branch should be preserved. If the value in the store is already a
pair, only the ith sub-expression is updated. Reconsider the example in Listing 5. The assignment
on line 3 happens in either of the two branches, or both the branches depending on the values of
u1 to u4. If it happens in only the first projection, the first part of the value-pair in y is updated.
Suppose that y = 〈[⊥,⊤]0 | [⊥,⊤]42〉?, initially, and u1 = u3 = true. Then, the value of y after the
assignment on line 3 becomesy = 〈[H ,⊤]1 | [⊥,⊤]42〉?. If u2 = false, then the else branch is taken,
and at the end of the assignment on line 5 the value of y is updated to y = 〈[H ,⊤]1 | [H ,⊤]2〉?
(Note that the first part of the pair already contains the value and the label-interval evaluated
through the then branch as we evaluate the two runs one after the other when branching on a pair
of values).
If the store value is not a pair, the value becomes a pair with the ith sub-expression the up-
dated value, and the other sub-expression the old value. Considering the same example as above,
if initially y = ([⊥,⊤]42)?, then at the end of then branch with u1 = true, the updated value of
y is y = 〈[H ,⊤]1 | [⊥,⊤]42〉?. When updates happen at the top-level, the entire value in the store
should be updated. The first rule applies when either the old or the new value is a pair and the
second rule applies when none of them are pairs. Note that this update rule is the reason why the
intervals in a pair may differ.
The output rule is the same except that the event being output now includes the index to aid
the statement and proof of noninterference. The P-If-Refine rule uses an augmented version of
refineWSet, which only refines label-intervals for the ith branch as shown in Figure 15. These rules
are included in the supplementary material along with the auxiliary functions they use.
5.2 Semantic Soundness and Completeness
To connect the semantics of the extended language with pairs to the monitor semantics, we prove
soundness and completeness theorems. These theorems depend on projections of the store, expression-
and command-configurations. Similar to the value projection seen in the previous section, the goal
of these projections is to obtain one execution from a paired execution.
The projection of a paired value, a paired interval, a normal value and interval are defined in Fig-
ure 12. The projection of stores (δ ) and traces (T) is inductively defined as shown in Figure 16. The
projection function only keeps the output events produced by the execution of concern and ignores
output performed by the other execution. The projection function for expression configurations is
⌊δ / e⌋i = ⌊δ⌋i / e and for command configurations is defined in Figure 16. The interesting case
is the projection of a command pair. We reassemble the pc-stack and wrap ci with curly braces to
reflect the fact that these pairs only appear in an if branch.
The Soundness theorem ensures that if a configuration can transition to another configuration,
then its projection can transition to the projection of the resulting configuration, generating the
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refineUBi :
refine(ιc , ι) = (_, ι
′) ιi = ι
′
ι j = ι {i, j} = {1, 2}
refineUBi (ιc , (ι u)
д) = 〈ι1 u | ι2 u〉
д
refine(ιc , ιi ) = (_, ι
′
i )
ι′j = ι j {i, j} = {1, 2}
refineUBi (ιc , 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉
д) = 〈ι′1 u1 | ι
′
2 u2〉
д
refine(ιci , ι) = (_, ιi )
ι j = ι {i, j} = {1, 2}
refineUBi (〈ιc1 | ιc2〉, (ι u)
д) = 〈ι1 u | ι2 u〉
д
v = 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉
д refine(ιci , ιi ) = (_, ι
′
i )
ι′j = ι j {i, j} = {1, 2}
refineUBi (〈ιc1 | ιc2〉,v) = 〈ι
′
1 u1 | ι
′
2 u2〉
д
refineUB:
refine(ιc , ι) = (_, ι
′)
refineUB(ιc , (ι u)
д) = (ι′ u)д
refine(ιi , ι) = (_, ι
′
i )
refineUB(〈ι1 | ι2〉, (ι u)
д) = 〈ι′1 u | ι
′
2 u〉
д
v = 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉
д
∀i ∈ {1, 2}. refine(ιc , ιi ) = (_, ι
′
i )
refineUB(ιc ,v) = 〈ι
′
1 u1 | ι
′
2 u2〉
д
v = 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉
д
∀i ∈ {1, 2}. refine(ιci , ιi ) = (_, ι
′
i )
refineUB(〈ιc1 | ιc2〉,v) = 〈ι
′
1 u1 | ι
′
2 u2〉
д
refineWSet:
rfLi (δ , ·,Π) = δ
δ ′ = rfLi (δ ,X ,Π) v
′
= refineUBi (Π,v)
rfLi ((δ , x
д 7→ v), (X , x),Π) = δ ′, xд 7→ v ′
rfLi (δ , ·,Π) = δ
δ ′ = rfLi (δ ,X ,Π) v
′
= refineUBi (Π,v)
rfLi ((δ , x
д 7→ v), (X , x),Π) = δ ′, xд 7→ v ′
ι′ = ιpc g ι δ
′
= rfLi (δ ,X , ι
′)
refineWSeti (δ ,X , ιpc, (ι u)
д) = δ ′
ι′ = ιpc g ι δ
′
= rfL(δ ,X , ι′)
refineWSet(δ ,X , ιpc, (ι u)
д) = δ ′
ι′1 = ιpc g ι1 ι
′
2 = ιpc g ι2 δ
′
= rfL(δ ,X , 〈ι′1 | ι
′
2〉)
refineWSet(δ ,X , ιpc, 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉
д) = δ ′
refineLB:
refine(ι, ιc ) = (ι
′
, _)
refineLB((ι u)д, ιc ) = (ι
′ u)д
∀i ∈ {1, 2}. refine(ιi , ι) = (ι
′
i , _)
refineLB(〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉, ι) = 〈ι
′
1 u1 | ι
′
2 u2〉
Fig. 15. Auxiliary definitions for label intervals in paired executions
same trace modulo projection. The Completeness theorem ensures that if both the projections
of a configuration terminate, then the configuration terminates in an equivalent state. We write,
⊢ κ, δ /i c wf, to indicate that the configuration is well-formed (defined in the supplementary
material). The formal soundness and completeness theorem statements are defined in Theorems 2
and 3. The proofs can be found in the supplementary material.
Theorem 2 (Soundness). If κ, δ / c
T
−→∗ κ ′, δ ′ / c ′ where ⊢ κ, δ / c wf, then ∀i ∈ {1, 2},
⌊κ, δ / c⌋i
⌊T⌋i
−→∗ ⌊κ ′, δ ′ / c ′⌋i
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Store projection:
⌊·⌋i = · ⌊δ , x 7→ v⌋i = ⌊δ⌋i , x 7→ ⌊v⌋i
Trace projection:
⌊·⌋i = · ⌊T, (j, ℓ,v)⌋i = ⌊T⌋i , (ℓ,v) if i = j
⌊T, (ℓ,v)⌋i = ⌊T⌋i , (ℓ, ⌊v⌋i) ⌊T, (j, ℓ,v)⌋i = ⌊T⌋i if i , j
Command-configuration projection:
⌊ιpc дpc, δ / skip⌋i = ιpc дpc , ⌊δ⌋i / skip
⌊κ, δ / c1⌋i = κ
′
, δ ′ / c ′1
⌊κ, δ / c1; c2⌋i = κ
′
, δ ′ / c ′1; c2
⌊ιpc дpc, δ / x := e⌋i = ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋i / x := e
⌊κ, δ / c⌋i = κ
′
, δ ′ / c ′
⌊κ ⊲ ιpc дpc, δ / {c}⌋i = κ
′
⊲ ιpc дpc , δ
′ / {c ′}
⌊ιpc дpc, δ / output(ℓ, e)⌋i = ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋i / output(ℓ, e)
∀{i, j} ∈ {1, 2}, c ′i =
{
skip if ci = skip and c j , skip
{ci } else
}
⌊ιpc дpc, δ / 〈κ1, ι1, c1 | κ2, ι2, c2〉д⌋i = κi ⊲ (ιpc g ιi ) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋i / c
′
i
⌊ιpc дpc, δ / 〈∅, ι1, skip | ∅, ι2, skip〉д⌋i = κi ⊲ (ιpc g ιi ) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋i / {skip}
⌊ιpc дpc, δ / if 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉
д then c1 else c2⌋i = ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋i / if (ιi ui )
д then c1 else c2
⌊ιpc дpc, δ / if (ι u)
д then c1 else c2⌋i = ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋i / if (ι u)
д then c1 else c2
⌊ιpc дpc, δ / if
X e then c1 else c2⌋i = ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋i / if
X e then c1 else c2
⌊ιpc дpc, δ / while
X e do c⌋i = ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋i / while
X e do c
Fig. 16. Projections
Theorem 3 (Completeness). If ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊κ, δ / c⌋i
Ti
−→∗ κi , δi / skip and ⊢ κ, δ / c wf, then
∃κ ′, δ ′ s.t. κ, δ / c
T
−→∗ κ ′, δ ′ / skip with ⌊κ ′, δ ′ / skip⌋i = κi , δi / skip and Ti = ⌊T⌋i .
5.3 Preservation
Before we explain the typing rules for the extended configuration, we define another label relation.
A gradual label is said to be “high” w.r.t an attacker, if the lower label in the interval is not lower
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Γ;κ ⊢r c
Γ;κ ⊢r c
Γ;κ ⊲ ι дpc ⊢r {c}
R-Pop
Γ; ι дpc ⊢ c
Γ; ι дpc ⊢r c
R-End
Γ;κ ⊲ ιpc дpc ⊢r c1
Γ; ιpc дpc ⊢ c2 κ , ∅
Γ;κ ⊲ ιpc дpc ⊢r c1; c2
R-C-Seq
∀i ∈ 1, 2, Γ;κi ⊲ (ιpc g ιi ) (дpc gc д) ⊢r ci ιi ⊢ д ∈ H (ℓA)
Γ; ιpc дpc ⊢r 〈κ1, ι1, c1 | κ2, ι2, c2〉д
R-C-Pair
Γ ⊢ e : boolд ιд = γ (д) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, Γ; ιpc g ιд дpc gc д ⊢ ci
Γ; ιpc дpc ⊢r if e then c1 else c2
R-C-If
Fig. 17. Typing rules for commands with pairs
than or equal to the level of the attacker.
ι = [ℓl , ℓr ] ℓl $ ℓA ι ⊑ γ (д)
ι ⊢ д ∈ H (ℓA)
All the pair typing rules are parameterized over attacker’s label ℓA, which we omit from the rules
for simplicity. The typing rule for value-pairs is shown below. The second premise checks that the
interval is representative of the gradual typeU . The last premise checks that it is possible thatU ’s
security label is high, meaning this pair of values is non-observable to the adversary.
∀i ∈ {1, 2}, Γ ⊢ ιi ui : τ
д ιi ⊑ γ (д) ιi ⊢ (д) ∈ H (ℓA)
Γ ⊢ 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉 : τ
д
R-V-Pair
We type the runtime commands with pairs using judgement of the form Γ;κ ⊢r c . We list the
rules for typing the commands in Figure 17.
Rule R-Pop types the inner command with only the top part of the pc-stack. When the pc-stack
contains only one element, R-End directly uses command typing. For pairs, R-C-Pair first checks
that each ci is well-typing, using the pc-context assembled from the local pc-context. The second
premise makes sure that these commands are typed (executed) in a high context. Here ιi is the
witness for д, which demonstrates that ci are high commands. The sequencing statement types
the second command using only the last pc on the stack because the execution order is from left
to right. We can only encounter branches in the first part of a sequencing statement and not the
second part before beginning the execution of the second command in the sequence. The typing
rule for if statements without a write-set is straightforward.
We define store, trace and configuration typing in Figure 18. The store δ types in the typing
environment Γ if all variables in δ are mapped to their respective type and gradual label in Γ. We
define top-level configuration typing as ⊢ κ, δ , c . For the typing for traces and actions, the output
value needs to be well-typed, and the label-interval of the value has to be lower than or equal to
the channel label.
Using these definitions, we prove that our paired-execution semantics preserve the configura-
tion typing and generate a well-typed trace. We write, ⊢ κ, δ /i c sf for i ∈ {·, 1, 2}, to indicate that
the configuration is safe. We say a configuration is safe if all of the following hold:
(1) if i ∈ {1, 2}, then κ ∈ H (ℓA), ∀x ∈ WtSet(c), intvl (δ (x)) ∈ H (ℓA)
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Store typing:
⊢ · : ·
T-S-Emp
⊢ δ : Γ Γ ⊢ v : U
⊢ δ , x 7→ v : Γ, x : U
T-S-Ind
Configuration typing:
⊢ δ : Γ Γ;κ ⊢r c
⊢ κ, δ , c
T-Conf
Trace typing:
⊢ v : U
⊢ intvl (v) 4 [ℓ, ℓ]
⊢ (ℓ,v)
T-A-Out
⊢ v : U ℓ $ ℓA
⊢ intvl (v) 4 [ℓ, ℓ]
⊢ (i, ℓ,v)
T-A-OutI
⊢ ·
T-T-Emp
⊢ α ⊢ T
⊢ α ,T
T-T-Ind
Fig. 18. Store, trace and configuration typing
(2) if c = if 〈_ | _〉 then c1 else c2, then ∀x ∈ WtSet(c), intvl (δ (x)) ∈ H (ℓA)
(3) if c = 〈κ1, ι1, c1 | κ2, ι2, c2〉д , then ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ιi ⊢ д ∈ H (ℓA), and ∀x ∈ WtSet(c), intvl (δ (x)) ∈
H (ℓA)
The proofs are included in the supplementary material.
Theorem 4 (Preservation). If κ, δ / c
T
−→∗ κ ′, δ ′ / c ′ with ⊢ κ, δ , c and ⊢ κ, δ / c sf, then
⊢ κ ′, δ ′, c ′ and ⊢ T
5.4 Noninterference
We show that the gradual type system presented above satisfies termination-insensitive noninter-
ference. We start by defining equivalence for values and stores (Figure 19). Two values are said to
be equivalent to an adversary at level ℓA if either they are both visible to the adversary and are the
same, or both not observable by the adversary. The noninterference theorem states that given a
program and two stores equivalent for an adversary at level ℓA, if the program terminates in both
the runs, then the ℓA-observable actions on both the runs are same. We also define equivalence of
traces w.r.t an adversary at level ℓA in Figure 19. We know that only when ℓ $ ℓA, the individual
runs can produce (i, ℓ,v) because the two runs diverge only when branching on pairs. Similarly,
(ℓ, 〈v1 |v2〉) can only be produced if ℓ $ ℓA, because pairs can only be typed if each individual inter-
val in the pair is high and rule P-Outmakes sure ℓ is lower than or equal to the pair’s interval. We
prove a simple lemma that establishes that given a well-typed trace of actions T, ⊢ ⌊T⌋1 ≈ℓA ⌊T⌋2.
We use these definitions to prove that our gradual type system satisfies noninterference for termi-
nating programs. The proof combines the Preservation, Soundness, and Completeness Theorems
and is shown in the associated supplementary material along with the additional lemmas.
Theorem 5 (Noninterference). Given an adversary label ℓA, a program c , and two stores δ1, δ2,
s.t., ⊢ δ1 ≈ℓA δ2 : Γ, and Γ; [⊥,⊥] ⊥ ⊢ c , and ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, [⊥,⊥] ⊥, δi / c
Ti
−→∗ κi , δ
′
i , skip, then
⊢ T1 ≈ℓA T2.
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Store equivalence:
д 4 c ℓA ι ⊑ γ (д)
⊢ (ι u)д : U
⊢ (ι u)д ≈ℓA (ι u)
д : U
EqV-L
∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ιi ⊢ д ∈ H (ℓA)
⊢ (ιi ui )
д : U
⊢ (ι1 u1)
д ≈ℓA (ι2 u2)
д : U
EqV-H
⊢ · ≈ℓA · : ·
EqS-Emp
⊢ δ1 ≈ℓA δ2 : Γ ⊢ v1 ≈ℓA v2 : U
⊢ δ1, x 7→ v1 ≈ℓA δ2, x 7→ v2 : Γ, x : U
EqS-Ind
Trace equivalence:
⊢ [] ≈ℓA []
EqT-Emp
⊢ T1 ≈ℓA T2 ℓ1 = ℓ2 4 ℓA v1 = v2
⊢ (ℓ1,v1) :: T1 ≈ℓA (ℓ2,v2) :: T2
EqT-L
⊢ T1 ≈ℓA T2 ℓ1 $ ℓA
⊢ (ℓ1,v1) :: T1 ≈ℓA T2
EqT-H-l
⊢ T1 ≈ℓA T2 ℓ2 $ ℓA
⊢ T1 ≈ℓA (ℓ2,v2) :: T2
EqT-H-r
Fig. 19. Equivalence definitions
5.5 Discussion
Implicit leaks manifested in noninterference proofs. Let’s revisit the example at the end of
Section 4.4 to see how the implicit leak manifests in the paired execution and why it leads to our
current design. We do not use the write sets in if statements and simply refine the label-intervals.
Because x is H , it’s initialized with a paired value.
δ = x 7→ 〈[H ,H ]trueH | [H ,H ]falseH 〉, y 7→ [L,H ]true?, z 7→ [L, L]trueL
c1 = if x then y := [L,H ]false
? else skip
c2 = if y then z := [L, L]false
L else skip
[L, L] L, δ / c1; c2 −→
· · · / if 〈[H ,H ]trueH | [H ,H ]falseH 〉 then y := [L,H ]false? else skip; c2 −→
· · · / 〈....,y := [L,H ]false?; c2 | ..., skip; c2〉 −→
The variable y is updated only in the left branch. To prove soundness and completeness of the
paired semantics, the two executions should be independent. Therefore, we try to update y in the
store as 〈[H ,H ]false | [L,H ]true〉?. However, this pair is not well-formed because pairs are only
well-typed if both intervals are inH . Clearly, the right branch ofy does not satisfy this requirement.
Therefore, we cannot prove preservation for the assignment case. For preservation to succeed, we
would need to refine the right branch to be [H ,H ]truewhen assigning toy in the left execution. But
then the two executions are no longer independent, which breaks the soundness (i.e., the projected
execution is not guaranteed to make progress or stay in the same state).
With these constraints in place, we need to refine y before the if statement branches, which
ultimately leads to our final design.
Generality of the write sets. The static write sets analysis in the typing rules is hard to scale
to a language with first-order stores. For languages with first-class functions and references, the
technique could be extended using regions and an effect type system to identity a sound over-
approximation of the write sets statically [Foster et al. 2002; Nielson et al. 1999].
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Labels and intervals:
ℓ ⊑ ? ℓ ⊑ ℓ
ℓ
′
1 4 ℓ1 ℓ2 4 ℓ
′
2
[ℓ1, ℓ2] ⊑ [ℓ
′
1, ℓ
′
2]
ι1 ⊑ ι
′
1 ι2 ⊑ ι
′
2
(ι1, ι2) ⊑ (ι
′
1, ι
′
2)
Expressions:
ι1 ⊑ ι2 д1 ⊑ д2
(ι1 u)
д1 ⊑ (ι2 u)
д2 x ⊑ x
e1 ⊑ e
′
1 e2 ⊑ e
′
2
e1 bop e2 ⊑ e
′
1 bop e
′
2
E ⊑ E ′ д1 ⊑ д2 e1 ⊑ e2
Eд1e1 ⊑ E
′
д2
e2
Commands:
skip ⊑ skip
c1 ⊑ c
′
1 c2 ⊑ c
′
2
c1; c2 ⊑ c
′
1; c
′
2
e1 ⊑ e2
x := e1 ⊑ x := e2
e1 ⊑ e2
output(ℓ, e1) ⊑ output(ℓ, e2)
e1 ⊑ e2 c1 ⊑ c
′
1 c2 ⊑ c
′
2
ifX e1 then c1 else c2 ⊑ if
X e2 then c
′
1 else c
′
2
e1 ⊑ e2 c1 ⊑ c2
whileX e1 do c1 ⊑ while
X e2 do c2
Store, Types and Typing-context:
∀x ∈ δ . δ (x) ⊑ δ ′(x)
δ ⊑ δ ′
д ⊑ д′
τд ⊑ τд
′
∀x ∈ Γ. Γ(x) ⊑ Γ′(x)
Γ ⊑ Γ′
PC-stack and Configurations:
∅ ⊑ ∅
ι ⊑ ι′ д ⊑ д′
ι д ⊑ ι′ д′
κ1 ⊑ κ
′
1 κ2 ⊑ κ
′
2
κ1 ⊲ κ2 ⊑ κ
′
1 ⊲ κ
′
2
κ ⊑ κ ′ δ ⊑ δ ′ c ⊑ c ′
κ, δ / c ⊑ κ ′, δ ′ / c ′
Fig. 20. Precision relations
6 GRADUAL GUARANTEES
The gradual guarantees state that if a program with more precise labels type-checks and is ac-
cepted by the runtime semantics of the gradual type system, then the same program with less
precise labels is also accepted by the gradual type system. To establish these guarantees, we define
precision relation between labels, expressions, and commands. The precision relations are shown
in Figure 20.
Siek et al. [2015] proposed gradual guarantees for both the type-system and the runtime se-
mantics. Our type system with gradual labels satisfies the static gradual guarantee. We also show
dynamic gradual guarantee for our calculus, i.e., if a command takes a step under a store and pc-
stack, then a less precise command can also take a step under a less precise store and pc-stack. The
proofs can be found in the supplementary material included with the submission.
Theorem 6 (Static Guarantee). If Γ1;д1 ⊢ c1, Γ1 ⊑ Γ2, д1 ⊑ д2, and c1 ⊑ c2, then Γ2;д2 ⊢ c2.
Theorem 7 (Dynamic Guarantee). If κ1, δ1 / c1
α1
−→ κ ′1, δ
′
1 / c
′
1 and κ1, δ1 / c1 ⊑ κ2, δ2 / c2,
then κ2, δ2 / c2
α2
−→ κ ′2, δ
′
2 / c
′
2 such that κ
′
1, δ
′
1 / c
′
1 ⊑ κ
′
2, δ
′
2 / c
′
2 and α1 = α2.
7 RELATED WORK
Prior work on information flow control has focussed on static, dynamic, and hybrid approaches.
Quite a few type-systems have been proposed to statically enforce noninterference by annotat-
ing variables with labels. Volpano et al. [1996] present the first type-system with information flow
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labels that satisfies a variant of noninterference, also known as termination-insensitive noninter-
ference. Heintze and Riecke [1998] propose SLam that enforces information flow control in lambda
calculus. Myers [1999] presents JFlow (and later JIF), enforcing information flow in Java. Our for-
malization borrows the proof-technique from FlowML, presented by Pottier and Simonet [2002],
for enforcing noninterference using pairs. Hunt and Sands [2006] present a security type system
for tracking information flow labels in a flow-sensitive manner.
Dynamic approaches use a runtime monitor to track the flow of information through the pro-
gram. The labels are mostly flow-sensitive in nature. Austin and Flanagan [2009] present a purely-
dynamic information flow monitoring approach that disallows assignments to public values in
secret contexts. Our monitor semantics follows a similar approach to prevent information leaks
at runtime. Subsequent work presents approaches to make the analysis more permissive and
amenable to dynamic languages [Austin and Flanagan 2010, 2012;Hedin and Sabelfeld 2012]. Devriese and Piessens
[2010] present a different approach for enforcing noninterference dynamically by executing multi-
ple copies of the program for different security levels. To leverage the benefits of static and dynamic
approaches for precision and permissiveness, researchers have also proposed hybrid approaches to
enforce noninterference [Buiras et al. 2015; Chandra and Franz 2007; Hedin et al. 2015; Just et al.
2011; Moore and Chong 2011; Russo and Sabelfeld 2010]. These approaches are not based on the
precision of type annotations, which is the focus of gradual typing.
Siek and Taha [2006] pioneered gradual typing to type programs with unknown types and
present an approach to combine static typing with dynamic typing. Subsequently, researchers have
focussed on gradualizing type-systemswith typestates [Wolff et al. 2011], ownership types [Sergey and Clarke
2012], effects [Schwerter et al. 2014], type annotations [Thiemann and Fennell 2014], and refine-
ment types [Jafery and Dunfield 2017; Lehmann and Tanter 2017; Rastogi et al. 2015].
More closely related to our work are works on gradual security types. Disney and Flanagan
[2011] study gradual security types for a pure lambda calculus, and Fennell and Thiemann [2013]
present a gradual type system for a calculus with ML-style references. However, these works are
based on adding explicit programmer-provided checks and casts to the code. Fennell and Thiemann
[2016] extend their prior work to object-oriented programs in a flow-sensitive setting for a Java-
like language. They use a hybrid approach to perform effect analysis that upgrades the labels of
variables similar to the write-set used in our analysis but do not prove the gradual guarantees for
their language. On the other hand, our approach has fixed gradual labels and refines only the label-
intervals associated with the value to satisfy dynamic gradual guarantee. More recently, Toro et al.
[2018] presented a type-driven gradual type system for a higher-order language with references
based on abstract gradual typing [Garcia et al. 2016]. Their formalization satisfies the static gradual
guarantee, but sacrifices the dynamic gradual guarantee for noninterference. They briefly discuss
the idea of using hybrid approaches and faceted evaluation for regaining the dynamic gradual
guarantee. The language presented in this paper is simpler than their language but has mutable
global variables and hence, has a similar issue with proving noninterference while satisfying the
dynamic gradual guarantee. It would be interesting to explore the possibility of extending the lan-
guage with first-class references and functions, and performing an effect analysis to determine the
write-set accurately for ensuring dynamic gradual guarantee alongside noninterference.
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We presented a gradual information flow type system for a simple imperative language that en-
forces termination-insensitive noninterference and enjoys the dynamic gradual guarantee at the
same time. We demonstrated that our monitor can stop implicit flows by taking care of the write-
sets of both branches, regardless of which branch is taken. The non-conventional proof technique
of noninterference that we used helps us identify the conditions for ensuring gradual guarantees.
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: March 2020.
:26 Abhishek Bichhawat, McKenna McCall, and Limin Jia
As a possible direction for future work, for languages with first-class functions and references,
the technique can possibly be extended using techniques proposed by Foster et al. [2002]; Nielson et al.
[1999], which use regions and side-effect analysis to determine aliases and points-to variables.
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A ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS
Write-set
The functionWtSet is defined as:
WtSet(x) = {x} WtSet(skip) = ∅ WtSet(output(ℓ, e)) = ∅ WtSet({c}) = WtSet(c)
WtSet(E e) = WtSet(e) WtSet(c1; c2) = WtSet(c1) ∪WtSet(c2)
WtSet(whileX e do c) = WtSet(c) WtSet(〈κ1, ι1, c1 | κ2, ι2, c2〉д) =WtSet(c1) ∪WtSet(c2)
WtSet(x := e2) = WtSet(x) WtSet(if
X e then c1 else c2) = WtSet(c1) ∪WtSet(c2)
Evaluation-context
The evaluation contexts are defined as below:
Eval. Ctx. C ::= [ ] | E [ ] | [ ] bop e |v bop [ ] |v := [ ] | output(l , [ ])
| if[ ] thenc1 elsec2
The semantics are shown in Figure 21.
δ / e ⇓ abort
δ / C[e] ⇓ abort
M-Ctx-Err
δ / e ⇓ abort
κ, δ / C[e] −→ abort
M-Ctx-C-Err
Fig. 21. Semantics for evaluation contexts
B TRANSLATION FROMWHILEG TOWHILEG
Evd
Lemma 1. If ι = γ (д), then ι ⊑ γ (д)
Proof. Case: д =?
ι = [⊥,⊤] and γ (д) = [⊥,⊤].
By the definition of 4, ⊥ 4 ⊥ and ⊤ 4 ⊤.
Thus by the definition of ⊑, ι ⊑ γ (д)
Case: д = ℓ
ι = [ℓ, ℓ] and γ (д) = [ℓ, ℓ].
By the definition of 4, ℓ 4 ℓ and ℓ 4 ℓ.
Thus by the definition of ⊑, ι ⊑ γ (д)

Lemma 2. If Γ ⊢ e : U and Γ ⊢ e { e ′ : U , then Γ ⊢ e ′ : U
Proof. By induction on the expression typing derivation.
Case: Bool, Int
By Lemma 1, γ (д) ⊑ γ (д).
By T-Bool, T-Int and G-Bool, G-Int, the conclusion holds
Case: Var
By definition of T-Var and G-Var
Case: Bop
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∀i ∈ {1, 2}, Γ ⊢ ei : τ
дi д = д1 gc д2
Γ ⊢ e1 bop e2 : τ
д
By IH,
(1) Γ ⊢ e ′i : τ
дi
By (1), T-Bool and G-Bool, the conclusion holds
Case: Cast
Γ ⊢ e : U ′ U ′ ≤ c U
Γ ⊢ e :: U : U
Assume U = τд . By IH,
(1) Γ ⊢ e ′ : τд
′
such that τд
′
≤ c τ
д
By (1), definition of evidence-based consistent subtyping and ⊑, Γ ⊢ (ι1, ι2)дe ′ : τд

Lemma 3. If Γ;дpc ⊢ c and Γ дpc ⊢ c { c ′, then WtSet(c) = WtSet(c ′)
Proof (sketch). By induction on the command typing derivation. Follows from the definition
ofWtSet for Skip, Assign, Out and additionally uses the IH for Seq, If, While 
Theorem 1. If Γ;дpc ⊢ c and Γ;дpc ⊢ c { c ′, then ∀ιpc ⊑ γ (дpc). Γ; ιpc дpc ⊢ c ′
Proof. By induction on the typing derivation - Γ;дpc ⊢ c .
Case: Skip
By definition of T-Skip, G-Skip
Case: Seq
Γ; дpc ⊢ c1 Γ; дpc ⊢ c2
Γ; дpc ⊢ c1; c2
By IH and inversion of T-Seq,
(1) Γ; ιpc дpc ⊢ c ′1 and Γ; ιpc дpc ⊢ c
′
2 such that ιpc ⊑ γ (дpc)
By (1), G-Seq, the conclusion holds
Case: Assign
By Lemma 2,
(1) Γ ⊢ x : τд and Γ ⊢ e ′ : τд
By assumption,
(2) ιpc ⊑ γ (дpc)
By inversion of Assign,
(3) дpc 4 c д
By (2), (3), the conclusion holds
Case: Out
By Lemma 2,
(1) Γ ⊢ e ′ : τд
By inversion of Out,
(2) д 4 c ℓ and дpc 4 c д
By assumption, Lemma 1 and inversion of T-Out,
(3) ιpc ⊑ γ (дpc), ι ⊑ γ (д) and [ℓ, ℓ] ⊑ γ (ℓ)
By (1),(2),(3), the conclusion holds
Case: If (similar forWhile)
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Γ ⊢ e : boolд Γ; дpc gc д ⊢ c1 Γ; дpc gc д ⊢ c2
Γ; дpc ⊢ if e then c1 else c2
If
By Lemma 2,
(1) Γ ⊢ e ′ : boolд
By IH,
(2) ∀ιpc ⊑ γ (дpc). Γ; ιpc g ιc дpc gc д ⊢ ci such that ιc = γ (д) and i ∈ {1, 2}
By inversion of T-If,
(3) X = WtSet(c ′1) ∪WtSet(c
′
2)
By (1), (2), (3), and Lemma 1, the conclusion holds

C PAIRED EXECUTIONS - AUXILIARY DEFINITIONS AND ADDITIONAL RULES
Figures 22 define the auxiliary definitions used in the semantics of paired-executions and the ad-
ditional rules for pairs.
D WELL-FORMEDNESS
(1) ⊢ v wf, if
(a) v = 〈v1 |v2〉, then ∀i ∈ {1, 2}.vi = (ιi ui )
(b) v = (ι u)д
(2) ⊢ δ wf, if ∀x ∈ δ , ⊢ δ (x) wf
(3) ⊢ δ /i e wf for i ∈ {·, 1, 2} if ⊢ δ wf
(4) ⊢ c wf, when the following hold:
(a) if c = 〈κ1, ι1, c1 | κ2, ι2, c2〉д , then ⊢ c1 wf, ⊢ c2 wf, and c1 and c2 do not contain pairs
(b) if c = if e then c1 else c2, then ⊢ c1 wf, ⊢ c2 wf, and c1 and c2 do not contain pairs or
braces
(c) if c = whileX e do c , then ⊢ c wf and c does not contain pairs or braces
(d) if c = c1; c2 then ⊢ c1 wf, ⊢ c2 wf and c2 does not contain pairs or braces
(e) if c = {c1}, then ⊢ c1 wf
(5) ⊢ κ, δ /i c wf for i ∈ {·, 1, 2}) if all of the following hold
(a) ⊢ c wf and ⊢ δ wf
(b) if i ∈ {1, 2}, then c does not contain pairs
Theorems and Proofs for Well-formedness
Lemma 4. If ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, E :: κ, δ /i c
α
−→ κ ′, δ ′ /i c
′ and ⊢ κ, δ /i c wf, then
(a). c ′ does not contain pairs and
(b). WtSet(c ′) ⊆ WtSet(c)
Proof. By induction on the structure of E.
c ′ doesn’t contain pairs: Follows from well-formedness definition for most rules. Pair-Seq,
Pair-Pc use the IH additionally.
WtSet(c ′) ⊆ WtSet(c):
Pair-Seq By IH, WtSet(c ′1) ⊆ WtSet(c1).
Thus by definition of WtSet, WtSet(c ′1; c2) ⊆ WtSet(c1; c2)
Pair-Pc By IH, WtSet(c ′) ⊆ WtSet(c)
Pair-Pop WtSet(skip) = WtSet(skip)
Pair-Skip WtSet(skip) ⊆ WtSet(skip) ∪WtSet(c)
Pair-Assign WtSet(skip) ⊆ WtSet(x)
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refineUBi :
refine(ιc , ι) = (_, ι
′) ιi = ι
′
ι j = ι {i, j} = {1, 2}
refineUBi (ιc , (ι u)
д) = 〈ι1 u | ι2 u〉
д
refine(ιc , ιi ) = (_, ι
′
i )
ι′j = ι j {i, j} = {1, 2}
refineUBi (ιc , 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉
д) = 〈ι′1 u1 | ι
′
2 u2〉
д
refine(ιci , ι) = (_, ι
′) ιi = ι
′
ι j = ι {i, j} = {1, 2}
refineUBi (〈ιc1 | ιc2〉, (ι u)
д) = 〈ι1 u | ι2 u〉
д
refine(ιci , ιi ) = (_, ι
′
i )
ι′j = ι j {i, j} = {1, 2}
refineUBi (〈ιc1 | ιc2〉, 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉
д) = 〈ι′1 u1 | ι
′
2 u2〉
д
refineUB:
refine(ιc , ι) = (_, ι
′)
refineUB(ιc , (ι u)
д) = (ι′ u)д
∀i ∈ {1, 2}. refine(ιc , ιi ) = (_, ι
′
i )
refineUB(ιc , 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉
д) = 〈ι′1 u1 | ι
′
2 u2〉
д
refine(ιi , ι) = (_, ι
′
i )
refineUB(〈ι1 | ι2〉, (ι u)
д) = 〈ι′1 u | ι
′
2 u〉
д
∀i ∈ {1, 2}. refine(ιci , ιi ) = (_, ι
′
i )
refineUB(〈ιc1 | ιc2〉, 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉
д) = 〈ι′1 u1 | ι
′
2 u2〉
д
refineWSet:
rfL(δ , ·, ι) = δ
δ ′ = rfL(δ ,X , ι)
rfL((δ , x 7→ v), (X , x), ι) = δ ′, x 7→ refineUB(ι,v)
rfLi (δ , ·,Π) = δ
δ ′ = rfLi (δ ,X ,Π)
rfLi ((δ , x
д 7→ v), (X , x),Π) = δ ′, xд 7→ refineUBi (Π,v)
ι′ = ιpc g ι δ
′
= rfLi (δ ,X , ι
′)
refineWSeti (δ ,X , ιpc, (ι u)) = δ
′
ι′ = ιpc g ι δ
′
= rfL(δ ,X , ι′)
refineWSet(δ ,X , ιpc, (ι u)
д) = δ ′
ι′1 = ιpc g ι1 ι
′
2 = ιpc g ι2 δ
′
= rfL(δ ,X , 〈ι′1 | ι
′
2〉)
refineWSet(δ ,X , ιpc, 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉) = δ
′
refineLB:
refine(ι, ιc ) = (ι
′
, _)
refineLB((ι u)д, ιc ) = (ι
′ u)д
∀i ∈ {1, 2}. refine(ιi , ι) = (ι
′
i , _)
refineLB(〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉, ι) = 〈ι
′
1 u1 | ι
′
2 u2〉
Fig. 22. Auxiliary definitions for paired executions
Pair-Out WtSet(skip) = WtSet(output)
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Pair-If WtSet(c1) ⊆ WtSet(c1) ∪WtSet(c2)
Pair-If-Refine WtSet(c1) ∪WtSet(c2) = WtSet(c1) ∪WtSet(c2)
Pair-While WtSet(c) ∪WtSet(c) ∪WtSet(skip) = WtSet(c)

Lemma 5. If ⊢ v wf, ⊢ v ′ wf and ⊢ δ wf, then
(1) ∀i ∈ {·, 1, 2}, ι. ⊢ refineUBi (ι,v) wf, ⊢ refineLB(v, ι) wf, ⊢ updi v v
′ wf and
(2) ∀i ∈ {·, 1, 2}, ι,X . ⊢ refineWSeti (δ ,X , ι,v)wf
Proof. By examining the respective definitions and induction for refineWSet. 
Lemma 6 (Well-formedness preservation). If κ, δ /i c
T
−→∗ κ ′, δ ′ /i c
′ where ⊢ κ, δ /i c wf,
then ⊢ κ ′, δ ′ /i c
′ wf
Proof. By induction of the number of steps in sequence. Base case follows by assumption.
Inductive Case: Holds for n steps; To show for n + 1 steps, i.e.,
if κ, δ /i c
T
−→n κ ′, δ ′ /i c
′ α−→ κ ′′, δ ′′ /i c
′′ where ⊢ κ, δ /i c wf, then ⊢ κ ′′, δ ′′ /i c ′′ wf
By IH
(1) ⊢ κ ′, δ ′ /i c ′ wf
By (1), T.S. If κ ′, δ ′ /i c ′
α
−→ κ ′′, δ ′′ /i c
′′ where ⊢ κ ′, δ ′ /i c ′ wf, then ⊢ κ ′′, δ ′′ /i c ′′ wf
Induction over the derivation. The proof follows from Lemma 4(a) and 5 in most cases.
Pair-Seq, Pair-Pc use the IH additionally and Pair-C-Pair uses Lemma 4(b) additionally.

E SOUNDNESS OF PAIRED-EXECUTION
Lemma 7. ∀x ∈ δ , i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊δ (x)⌋i = ⌊δ⌋i (x) and ⌊rd δ (x)⌋i = rdi δ (x) = rd ⌊δ⌋i (x)
Proof. δ (x) can be a pair or normal value
Case: δ (x) = (ι u)д
By store-projection ⌊δ⌋i (x) = ⌊(ι u)д⌋i = (ι u)д
By definition of rd, rd δ (x) = (ι u)д and
rdi δ (x) = (ι u)
д and rd ⌊δ⌋i (x) = (ι u)д
By projection of values, the conclusion holds.
Case: δ (x) = 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉
д
By store-projection definition: ⌊δ⌋i (x) = (ιi ui )д
By definition of rd, rd δ (x) = 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉д and
rdi δ (x) = (ιi ui )
д and rd ⌊δ⌋i (x) = (ιi ui )д
By projection of values, ⌊δ (x)⌋i = (ιi ui )д and ⌊rd δ (x)⌋i = (ιi ui )д

Lemma 8. ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊upd vo vn⌋i = upd ⌊vo⌋i ⌊vn⌋i
Proof. vo and vn can be a pair or normal value. We show when both are pairs and when vo is
pair. Other cases are similar.
Case: vo = 〈ιo uo | ι
′
o ;u
′
o〉
д and vn = 〈ιn un | ι′n ;u
′
n〉
д . We show for i = 1.
By projection of values,
(1) ⌊vo⌋1 = (ιo uo)д and ⌊vn⌋1 = (ιn un)д
By (1), definition of upd,
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(2) upd ⌊vo⌋1 ⌊vn⌋1 = (ι′ un)д where refine(ιn, ιo) = (_, ι′)
By definition of upd,
(3) upd vo vn = 〈ι1 un | ι′1 u
′
n〉
д where refine(ιn, ιo) = (_, ι1) and refine(ι′n, ι
′
o) = (_, ι
′
1)
By (2), (3) and projection of values
⌊upd vo vn⌋1 = (ι1 un)
д and ι1 = ι′
Case: vo = 〈ιo uo | ι
′
o ;u
′
o〉
д and vn = (ιn un)д . We show for i = 1.
By projection of values,
(1) ⌊vo⌋1 = (ιo uo)д and ⌊vn⌋1 = (ιn un)д
By (1), definition of upd,
(2) upd ⌊vo⌋1 ⌊vn⌋1 = (ι′ un)д where refine(ιn, ιo) = (_, ι′)
By definition of upd,
(3) upd vo vn = 〈ι1 un | ι′1 u
′
n〉
д where refine(ιn, ιo) = (_, ι1) and refine(ιn, ι′o) = (_, ι
′
1)
By (2), (3) and projection of values
⌊upd vo vn⌋1 = (ι1 un)
д and ι1 = ι′

Lemma 9. ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊refineLB(v, ι)⌋i = refineLB(⌊v⌋i , ι)
Proof. v can be a pair or normal value.
Case: v = 〈ι1 u1 | ι2;u2〉д
By projection of values,
(1) ⌊v⌋i = (ιi ui )д
By (1), definition of refineLB,
(2) refineLB(⌊v⌋i , ι) = (ι′i ui )
д where refine(ιi , ι) = (ι′i , _)
By definition of refineLB,
(3) refineLB(v, ι) = 〈ι′′1 u1 | ι
′′
2 u2〉
д where refine(ιi , ι) = (ι′′1 , _)
By (2), (3) and projection of values, the conclusion holds
Case: v = (ι1 u1)
д
By projection of values,
(1) ⌊v⌋i = (ι1 u1)д
By (1), definition of refineLB,
(2) refineLB(⌊v⌋i , ι) = (ι′ u1)д where refine(ι1, ι) = (ι′, _)
By definition of refineLB,
(3) refineLB(v, ι) = (ι′1 u1)
д where refine(ι1, ι) = (ι′1, _)
By (2), (3) and projection of values, the conclusion holds

Lemma 10. ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊refineUB(Π,v)⌋i = refineUB(⌊Π⌋i , ⌊v⌋i )
Proof. Π can be a pair of intervals or single interval and v can be a pair or normal value.
Case: Π = 〈ι1 | ι2〉, v = 〈ι′1 u1 | ι
′
2;u2〉
д
By projection of values,
(1) ⌊v⌋i = (ι′i ui )
д and ⌊Π⌋i = ιi
By (1), definition of refineUB,
(2) refineUB(⌊Π⌋i , ⌊v⌋i ) = (ι′′i ui )
д where refine(ιi , ι′i ) = (_, ι
′′
i )
By definition of refineUB,
(3) refineUB(Π,v) = 〈ι′′′1 u1 | ι
′′′
2 u2〉
д where refine(ιi , ι′i ) = (_, ι
′′′
i )
By (2), (3) and projection of values, the conclusion holds
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Case: Π = 〈ι1 | ι2〉, v = (ι u)д
By projection of values,
(1) ⌊v⌋i = (ι u)д and ⌊Π⌋i = ιi
By (1), definition of refineUB,
(2) refineUB(⌊Π⌋i , ⌊v⌋i ) = (ι′i u)
д where refine(ιi , ι) = (_, ι′i )
By definition of refineUB,
(3) refineUB(Π,v) = 〈ι′1 u | ι
′
2 u〉
д where refine(ιi , ι) = (_, ι′i )
By (2), (3) and projection of values, the conclusion holds
Case: Π = ι, v = 〈ι1 u1 | ι2;u2〉д
By projection of values,
(1) ⌊v⌋i = (ιi ui )д and ⌊Π⌋i = ι
By (1), definition of refineUB,
(2) refineUB(⌊Π⌋i , ⌊v⌋i ) = (ι′i ui )
д where refine(ι, ιi ) = (_, ι′i )
By definition of refineUB,
(3) refineUB(Π,v) = 〈ι′1 u1 | ι
′
2 u2〉
д where refine(ι, ιi ) = (_, ι′i )
By (2), (3) and projection of values, the conclusion holds
Case: Π = ιc , v = (ι u)д
By projection of values,
(1) ⌊v⌋i = (ι u)д and ⌊Π⌋i = ιc
By (1), definition of refineUB,
(2) refineUB(⌊Π⌋i , ⌊v⌋i ) = (ι′ u)д where refine(ιc , ι) = (_, ι′)
By definition of refineUB,
(3) refineUB(Π,v) = (ι′ u)д where refine(ιc , ι) = (_, ι′)
By (2), (3) and projection of values, the conclusion holds

Lemma 11. ∀{i, j} ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊refineUBi (Π,v)⌋i = refineUB(⌊Π⌋i , ⌊v⌋i )∧⌊refineUBi (Π,v)⌋j = ⌊v⌋j
Proof. Π can be a pair of intervals or single interval and v can be a pair or normal value. We
show for i = 1, j = 2.
Case: Π = 〈ιc1 | ιc2〉, v = 〈ι1 u1 | ι2;u2〉д
By projection of values,
(1) ⌊Π⌋1 = ιc1, ⌊v⌋1 = (ι1 u1)д and ⌊v⌋2 = (ι2 u2)д
(2) Let refine(ιc1, ι1) = (_, ι′i )
By (1), definition of refineUBi ,
(2) refineUB1(⌊Π⌋1, ⌊v⌋1) = 〈ι
′
1 u1 | ι1 u1〉
д
By definition of refineUBi ,
(3) refineUB1(Π,v) = 〈ι
′
1 u1 | ι2 u2〉
д
By (1), (2), (3) and projection of values,
(4) ⌊refineUB1(Π,v)⌋1 = refineUB1(⌊Π⌋1, ⌊v⌋1) and ⌊refineUB1(Π,v)⌋2 = ⌊v⌋2
Case: Π = 〈ιc1 | ιc2〉, v = (ι u)д
By projection of values,
(1) ⌊Π⌋1 = ιc1, ⌊v⌋1 = (ι u)д and ⌊v⌋2 = (ι u)д
(2) Let refine(ιc1, ι) = (_, ι′)
By (1), definition of refineUBi ,
(2) refineUB1(⌊Π⌋1, ⌊v⌋1) = 〈ι
′ u | ι u〉д
By definition of refineUBi ,
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(3) refineUB1(Π,v) = 〈ι
′ u | ι u〉д
By (1), (2), (3) and projection of values,
(4) ⌊refineUB1(Π,v)⌋1 = refineUB1(⌊Π⌋1, ⌊v⌋1) = (ι
′ u)д and ⌊refineUB1(Π,v)⌋2 = ⌊v⌋2 = (ι u)
д
Case: Π = ι, v = 〈ι1 u1 | ι2;u2〉д
By projection of values,
(1) ⌊Π⌋1 = ι, ⌊v⌋1 = (ι1 u1)д and ⌊v⌋2 = (ι2 u2)д
(2) Let refine(ι, ι1) = (_, ι′1)
By (1), definition of refineUBi ,
(2) refineUB1(⌊Π⌋1, ⌊v⌋1) = 〈ι
′
1 u1 | ι u1〉
д
By definition of refineUBi ,
(3) refineUB1(Π,v) = 〈ι
′
1 u1 | ι2 u2〉
д
By (1), (2), (3) and projection of values,
(4) ⌊refineUB1(Π,v)⌋1 = refineUB1(⌊Π⌋1, ⌊v⌋1) = (ι
′
1 u1)
д and ⌊refineUB1(Π,v)⌋2 = ⌊v⌋2 = (ι2 u2)
д
Case: Π = ιc , v = (ι u)д
By projection of values,
(1) ⌊Π⌋1 = ιc , ⌊v⌋1 = (ι u)д and ⌊v⌋2 = (ι u)д
(2) Let refine(ιc , ι) = (_, ι′)
By (1), definition of refineUBi ,
(2) refineUB1(⌊Π⌋1, ⌊v⌋1) = 〈ι
′ u | ι u〉д
By definition of refineUBi ,
(3) refineUB1(Π,v) = 〈ι
′ u | ι u〉д
By (1), (2), (3) and projection of values,
(4) ⌊refineUB1(Π,v)⌋1 = refineUB1(⌊Π⌋1, ⌊v⌋1) = (ι
′ u)д and ⌊refineUB1(Π,v)⌋2 = ⌊v⌋2 = (ι u)
д

Lemma 12. ∀δ ,X , x .x ∈ X =⇒ x ∈ δ , we have ∀{i, j} ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊rfLi (δ ,X ,Π)⌋i = rfL(⌊δ⌋i ,X , ⌊Π⌋i )
and ⌊rfLi (δ ,X ,Π)⌋j = ⌊δ⌋j
Proof. By induction on the size of X and applying Lemma 11 
Lemma 13. ∀δ ,X .X ⊆ δ , we have ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊rfL(δ ,X ,Π)⌋i = rfL(⌊δ⌋i ,X , ⌊Π⌋i )
Proof. By induction on the size of X and applying Lemma 10 
Lemma 14. If ∀δ ,X ,v, ιc .X ⊆ δ and v is not a pair, then
∀{i, j} ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊refineWSeti (δ ,X , ιc ,v)⌋i = refineWSet(⌊δ⌋i ,X , ιc ,v) and ⌊refineWSeti (δ ,X , ιc ,v)⌋j =
⌊δ⌋j
Proof. Follows from Lemma 12 
Lemma 15. ∀δ ,X ,v, ιc .X ⊆ δ , we have ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊refineWSet(δ ,X , ιc ,v)⌋i = refineWSet(⌊δ⌋i ,X , ιc , ⌊v⌋i )
Proof. Follows from Lemma 13 
Lemma 16. If v is not a pair, then
(1) ∀ι, refineUB(ι,v) is not a pair
(2) ∀ι, refineLB(v, ι) is not a pair
Proof. By examining the respective definitions. 
Lemma 17. If ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, E :: δ /i e ⇓ vi and ⊢ δ /i e wf, then ⌊δ⌋i / e ⇓ vi and vi is not a pair
Proof. By induction on the structure of E.
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Case: P-Const
By P-Const,
(1) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊δ⌋i / (ι u)д ⇓ (ι u)д
Case: P-Var
By P-Var
(1) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊δ⌋i / x ⇓ rd⌊δ⌋i (x)
δ (x) is either a pair or normal value:
Subcase I: δ (x) = 〈v1 |v2〉
д
By definition of rd and value projection
(I1) rdiδ (x) = vi
By (1), definition of store projection and rd
(I2) ⌊δ⌋i (x) = vi and rd vi = vi
By (I1) and (I2), rdiδ (x) = rd⌊δ⌋i (x)
As ⊢ δ /i e wf, δ (x) cannot have nested pairs. Hence, vi is not a pair
Subcase II: δ (x) = v = (ι u)д
By definition of rd and value projection
(II1) rdiδ (x) = v ; v is a normal value and not a pair
By (1), definition of store projection and rd
(II2) ⌊δ⌋i (x) = v and rd v = v
By (II1) and (II2), rdiδ (x) = rd⌊δ⌋i (x)
Case: P-Bop
(1)
δ /i e1 ⇓ v1 δ /i e2 ⇓ v2 v = v1 bop v2
δ /i e1 bop e2 ⇓ v
By IH
(2) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊δ⌋i / e1 ⇓ v1 and ⌊δ⌋i / e2 ⇓ v2 and v1 and v2 are not pairs
By (2), P-Bop and binary operation on values, the conclusion holds
Case: P-Cast
(1)
δ /i e ⇓ v v
′
= (E,д) ⊲v
δ /i E
дe ⇓ v ′
By IH
(2) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊δ⌋i / e ⇓ v and v is not a pair
(3) Let v = (ι u)д
′
, then v ′ = (ι′ u)д such that ι′ = ι ⊲⊳ E
By (2), (3) and P-Cast, the conclusion holds

Lemma 18. If κ, δ / c
α
−→ κ ′, δ ′ / c ′, where κ = κ¯ ⊲ ιpc дpc , then ∃κ¯
′ s.t. κ ′ = κ¯ ′ ⊲ ιpc дpc
Proof. By induction on the structure of the derivation. 
Lemma 19. If ∀{i, j} ∈ {1, 2}, κ, δ /i c
α
−→ κ ′, δ ′ /i c
′, ⊢ κ, δ /i c wf then κ, ⌊δ⌋i / c
⌊α ⌋i
−→
κ ′, ⌊δ ′⌋i / c
′, ⌊δ⌋j = ⌊δ
′⌋j and ⌊α⌋j = ·
Proof. By induction on the structure of command-evaluation derivation.
Case: P-Seq
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κ, δ /i c1
α
−→ κ ′, δ ′ /i c
′
1
κ, δ /i c1; c2
α
−→ κ ′, δ ′ /i c
′
1; c2
By IH
(1) ∀{i, j} ∈ {1, 2}, κ, ⌊δ⌋i / c1
⌊α ⌋i
−→ κ ′, ⌊δ ′⌋i / c
′
1, ⌊δ⌋j = ⌊δ
′⌋j and ⌊α⌋j = ·,
By (1) and definition of P-Seq
(2) ∀{i, j} ∈ {1, 2}, κ, ⌊δ⌋i / c1; c2
⌊α ⌋i
−→ κ ′, ⌊δ ′⌋i / c
′
1; c2 and ⌊δ⌋j = ⌊δ
′⌋j and ⌊α⌋j = ·,
Case: P-Pc
κ, δ /i c
α
−→ κ ′, δ ′ /i c
′
κ ⊲ ιpc дpc, δ /i {c}
α
−→ κ ′ ⊲ ιpc дpc , δ
′ /i {c
′}
By IH
(1) ∀{i, j} ∈ {1, 2}, κ, ⌊δ⌋i / c
⌊α ⌋i
−→ κ ′, ⌊δ ′⌋i / c
′ and ⌊δ⌋j = ⌊δ ′⌋j and ⌊α⌋j = ·,
By (1) and definition of P-Pc, the conclusion holds
Case: P-Pop, P-Skip, P-If, P-While
By definition of P-Pop, P-Skip, P-If, P-While
Case: P-Assign
By Lemma 17
(1) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊δ⌋i / e ⇓ v0 such that v0 = v and v is not a pair
By definition of P-Assign and Lemma 16,
(1a) v ′ = v ′0 where v
′
0 is obtained by operations on v0 and is not a pair
By assumption
(2) δ ′ = δ [x 7→ updi δ (x) v
′],
By (1), and definition of P-Assign,
(2) δ ′′ = ⌊δ⌋i [x 7→ upd ⌊δ⌋i (x) v ′],
T.S. ⌊δ ′⌋i = δ ′′ or ∀x .⌊δ ′(x)⌋i = δ ′′(x)
We show for i = 1, j = 2, the proof is similar for i = 2, j = 1
Subcase I: Suppose i = 1, j = 2, v ′ = (ι u)д and δ (x) = 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉д
By store projection
(I1) ⌊δ⌋1(x) = (ι1 u1)д and ⌊δ⌋2(x) = (ι2 u2)д
By definition of upd and value projection
(I2) δ ′(x) = 〈ι′ u | ι2 u2〉д where refine(ι, ι1) = (_, ι′) and ⌊δ ′⌋2(x) = (ι2 u2)д
By (I1), definition of upd
(I3) δ ′′(x) = (ι′′ u)д where refine(ι, ι1) = (_, ι′′)
By (I2) and (I3), ⌊δ ′(x)⌋1 = δ ′′(x), ⌊δ⌋2(x) = ⌊δ ′⌋2(x) and ∀y.y , x =⇒ ⌊δ (y)⌋i = ⌊δ⌋i (y)
Subcase II: Suppose i = 1, j = 2, v ′ = (ι u)д and δ (x) = (ι1 u1)д
By store projection
(I1) ⌊δ⌋1(x) = (ι1 u1)д and ⌊δ⌋2(x) = (ι1 u1)д
By definition of upd and value projection
(I2) δ ′(x) = 〈ι′ u | ι1 u1〉д where refine(ι, ι1) = (_, ι′) and ⌊δ ′⌋2(x) = (ι1 u1)д
By (I1), definition of upd
(I3) δ ′′(x) = (ι′′ u)д where refine(ι, ι1) = (_, ι′′)
By (I2) and (I3), ⌊δ ′(x)⌋1 = δ ′′(x), ⌊δ⌋2(x) = ⌊δ ′⌋2(x) and ∀y.y , x =⇒ ⌊δ (y)⌋i = ⌊δ⌋i (y)
Case: P-Out
By Lemma 17,
(1) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊δ⌋i / e ⇓ v0 such that v0 = v and v is not a pair
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By definition of P-Out and Lemma 16,
(1a) v1 = v ′1 where v
′
1 is obtained by operations on v0 and is not a pair
By definition of trace-projection,
(2) ⌊i, ℓ,v1⌋i = (ℓ,v1) and ⌊i, ℓ,v1⌋j = · where i , j
Case: P-If-Refine
By Lemma 17
(1) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊δ⌋i / e ⇓ v and v is not a pair,
By Lemma 15,
(2) ∀{i, j} ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊refineWSeti (δ ,X , ιpc,v)⌋i = refineWSet(⌊δ⌋i ,X , ιpc,v)
and ⌊refineWSeti (δ ,X , ιpc,v)⌋j = ⌊δ⌋j
By (1), (2) and definition of P-If-Refine, the conclusion holds

Lemma 20 (Expression soundness). If E :: δ / e ⇓ v and ⊢ δ / e wf then ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊δ / e⌋i ⇓
⌊v⌋i
Proof. By induction on the structure of E.
Case: P-Const
By P-Const and projection of values
Case: P-Var
By assumption
(1) v = rd δ (x)
T.S. ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, rd ⌊δ⌋i (x) = ⌊rd δ (x)⌋i
We show for i = 1, the proof is similar for i = 2
Subcase I: δ (x) = 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉
д
By definition of rd
(I1) ⌊rd δ (x)⌋1 = (ι1 u1)д
By store-projection definition and definition of rd
(I2) rd ⌊δ⌋1(x) = (ι1 u1)д
By (I1) and (I2), the conclusion holds
Subcase II: δ (x) = (ι u)д
By definition of rd
(II1) ⌊rd δ (x)⌋1 = (ι u)д
By store-projection definition and definition of rd
(II2) rd ⌊δ⌋1(x) = (ι u)д
By (II1) and (II2), the conclusion holds
Case: P-Bop
(1)
δ / e1 ⇓ v1 δ / e2 ⇓ v2 v = v1 bop v2
δ / e1 bop e2 ⇓ v
By (1) and IH
(2) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊δ⌋i / e1 ⇓ ⌊v1⌋i and ⌊δ⌋i / e2 ⇓ ⌊v2⌋i
T.S. ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊v1⌋i bop ⌊v2⌋i = ⌊v1 bop v2⌋i
We show for i = 1, the proof is similar for i = 2
Subcase I: v1 = 〈ι1 u1 | ι
′
1 u
′
1〉
д1 , v2 = 〈ι2 u2 | ι′2 u
′
2〉
д2
By definition of bop,
(I1) v1 bop v2 = 〈ι u | _〉д and ⌊v1 bop v2⌋1 = (ι u)д
where ι = ι1 g ι2, u = u1 bop u2 and д = д1 gc д2
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By value-projection definition
(I2) ⌊v1⌋1 = (ι1 u1)д and ⌊v2⌋1 = (ι2 u2)д
By (I2) and definition of bop,
(I3) ⌊v1⌋1 bop ⌊v2⌋1 = (ι u)д where ι = ι1 g ι2, u = u1 bop u2 and д = д1 gc д2
By (I1) and (I3), the conclusion holds
Subcase II: v1 = 〈ι1 u1 | ι
′
1 u
′
1〉
д1 , v2 = (ι2 u2)д2 , similar for v1 = (ι1 u1)д1 , v2 = 〈ι2 u2 | ι′2 u
′
2〉
д2 ,
By definition of bop,
(II1) v1 bop v2 = 〈ι u | _〉д and ⌊v1 bop v2⌋1 = (ι u)д
where ι = ι1 g ι2, u = u1 bop u2 and д = д1 gc д2
By value-projection definition
(II2) ⌊v1⌋1 = (ι1 u1)д and ⌊v2⌋1 = (ι2 u2)д
By (II2) and definition of bop,
(II3) ⌊v1⌋1 bop ⌊v2⌋1 = (ι u)д where ι = ι1 g ι2, u = u1 bop u2 and д = д1 gc д2
By (II1) and (II3), the conclusion holds
Subcase III: v1 = (ι1 u1)
д1 , v2 = (ι2 u2)д2
By definition of bop,
(III1) v1 bop v2 = (ι u)д and ⌊v1 bop v2⌋1 = (ι u)д
where ι = ι1 g ι2, u = u1 bop u2 and д = д1 gc д2
By value-projection definition
(III2) ⌊v1⌋1 = (ι1 u1)д and ⌊v2⌋1 = (ι2 u2)д
By (III2) and definition of bop,
(III3) ⌊v1⌋1 bop ⌊v2⌋1 = (ι u)д where ι = ι1 g ι2, u = u1 bop u2 and д = д1 gc д2
By (III1) and (III3), the conclusion holds
Case: P-Cast
(1)
δ / e ⇓ v v ′ = (E,д) ⊲v
δ / Eдe ⇓ v ′
By IH and (1)
(2) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊δ / e⌋i ⇓ ⌊v⌋i
We show for i = 1, the proof is similar for i = 2
Subcase I: v = 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉
д′ ,
By definition of ⊲ cast operation,
(I1) v ′ = 〈ι′1 u1 | ι
′
2 u2〉
д and ⌊v ′⌋1 = (ι′1 u1)
д where ι′1 = ι1 ⊲⊳ E
By value-projection definition and cast operation,
(I2) ⌊v⌋1 = (ι1 u1)д
′
and v ′′1 = (ι
′′
1 u1)
д where ι′′1 = ι1 ⊲⊳ E
By (I1) and (I2), the conclusion holds
Subcase II: v = (ι u)д
′
,
By definition of cast
(II1) v ′ = (ι′ u)д and ⌊v ′⌋1 = (ι′ u)д where ι′ = ι ⊲⊳ E
By definition of value-projection and cast
(II2) ⌊v⌋1 = (ι u)д
′
and v ′′ = (ι′′ u)д where ι′′ = ι ⊲⊳ E
By (II1) and (II2), the conclusion holds

Lemma 21 (Soundness). If κ, δ / c
α
−→ κ ′, δ ′ / c ′ where ⊢ κ, δ / c wf,
then ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊κ, δ / c⌋i
⌊α ⌋i
−→ ⌊κ ′, δ ′ / c ′⌋i , or ⌊κ, δ / c⌋i = ⌊κ
′, δ ′ / c ′⌋i and ⌊α⌋i = ·
Proof. By induction on the structure of the command derivation.
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Case: P-Seq
κ, δ / c1
α
−→ κ ′, δ ′ / c ′1
κ, δ / c1; c2
α
−→ κ ′, δ ′ / c ′1; c2
By IH
(1) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊κ, δ / c1⌋i
⌊α ⌋i
−→ ⌊κ ′, δ ′ / c ′1⌋i , or ⌊κ, δ / c1⌋i = ⌊κ
′, δ ′ / c ′1⌋i
By (1), projection of commands and definition of P-Seq
(2) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊κ, δ / c1; c2⌋i
⌊α ⌋i
−→ ⌊κ ′, δ ′ / c ′1; c2⌋i , or ⌊κ, δ / c1; c2⌋i = ⌊κ
′, δ ′ / c ′1; c2⌋i
Case: P-Pc
κ, δ / c
α
−→ κ ′, δ ′ / c ′
κ ⊲ ιpc дpc, δ / {c}
α
−→ κ ′ ⊲ ιpc дpc, δ
′ / {c ′}
By IH
(1) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊κ, δ / c⌋i
⌊α ⌋i
−→ ⌊κ ′, δ ′ / c ′⌋i , or ⌊κ, δ / c⌋i = ⌊κ ′, δ ′ / c ′⌋i
By (1), projection of commands and definition of P-Pc
(2) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊κ ⊲ ιpc дpc , δ / {c}⌋i
⌊α ⌋i
−→ ⌊κ ′ ⊲ ιpc дpc, δ
′ / {c ′}⌋i
or ⌊κ ⊲ ιpc дpc, δ / {c}⌋i = ⌊κ ′ ⊲ ιpc дpc, δ ′ / {c ′}⌋i
Case: P-Pop, P-Skip, P-If, P-While
By projection of commands, well-formedness definition and
definition of P-Pop, P-Skip, P-If, P-While
Case: P-Assign
By Lemma 20
(1) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊δ / e⌋i ⇓ vi such that vi = ⌊v⌋i ,
By projection of interval operations, Lemma 10,
(2) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, v ′ = refineUB(ιpc,v) and v ′i = refineUB(ιpc, ⌊v⌋i ) and ⌊v
′⌋i = v
′
i ,
By (2),
(3) ⌊δ ′(x)⌋i = ⌊δ ′⌋i (x)
By (1), projection of commands and definition of P-Assign,
(4) δ ′(x) = upd δ (x) v ′ and δ ′i (x) = upd ⌊δ⌋i (x) v
′
i ;
By (3), (4) and Lemma 8, the conclusion follows
Case: P-Out
By Lemma 20
(1) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊δ / e⌋i ⇓ ⌊v⌋i ,
By projection of interval operations, Lemmas 9 and 10,
(2) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊refineLB(v, [ℓ, ℓ])⌋i = refineLB(⌊v⌋i , [ℓ, ℓ]),
v ′′ = refineUB(ιpc,v
′) and v ′′i = refineUB(⌊ιpc⌋i , ⌊v
′⌋i ) and ⌊v ′′⌋i = v ′′i
By (1), (2), projection of commands and traces, and definition of P-Out,
(3) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊(ℓ,v ′′)⌋i = (ℓ,v ′′i ),
Case: P-If-Refine
By Lemma 20
(1) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊δ / e⌋i ⇓ ⌊v⌋i ,
By Lemma 15,
(2) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊refineWSet(δ ,X , ιpc,v)⌋i = refineWSet(⌊δ⌋i ,X , ιpc, ⌊v⌋i )
By (1), (2), projection of commands and definition of P-If-Refine, the conclusion holds
Case: P-C-Pair where c1 and c2 are not skip
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article . Publication date: March 2020.
:41
We show for i = 1, j = 2. The proof is similar for i = 2, j = 1
By assumption and Lemma 19
(1) κ1 ⊲ (ιpc g ι1) (д gc дpc), ⌊δ⌋1 / c1
α
−→ κ ′1 ⊲ (ιpc g ι1) (д gc дpc), ⌊δ
′⌋1 / c
′
1,
and κ2 = κ ′2, c2 = c
′
2, ⌊δ⌋2 = ⌊δ
′⌋2
By projection of commands
(2) ⌊ιpc дpc, δ / 〈κ1, ι1, c1 | κ2, ι2, c2〉д⌋1 = κ1 ⊲ (ιpc g ι1) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋1 / {c1}
(3) ⌊ιpc дpc, δ ′ / 〈κ ′1, ι1, c
′
1 | κ
′
2, ι2, c
′
2〉д⌋1 = κ
′
1 ⊲ (ιpc g ι1) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ
′⌋1 / {c
′
1}
(4) ⌊ιpc дpc, δ / 〈κ1, ι1, c1 | κ2, ι2, c2〉д⌋2 = κ2 ⊲ (ιpc g ι2) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋2 / {c2}
(5) ⌊ιpc дpc, δ ′ / 〈κ ′1, ι1, c
′
1 | κ
′
2, ι2, c
′
2〉д⌋2 = κ2 ⊲ (ιpc g ι2) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋2 / {c2}
By definition of P-Pc
(6) If κ, δ / c
α
−→ κ ′, δ ′ / c ′ then κ ⊲ ιpc дpc, δ / {c}
α
−→ κ ′ ⊲ ιpc дpc, δ
′ / {c ′}
By (1), (2), (3) and (6)
(7) κ1 ⊲ (ιpc g ι1) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋1 / {c1}
α
−→ κ ′1 ⊲ (ιpc g ι1) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ
′⌋1 / {c
′
1}
By (4), (5)
(8) κ2 ⊲ (ιpc g ι2) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋2 / {c2} = κ ′2 ⊲ (ιpc g ι2) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ
′⌋2 / {c
′
2}
By (7) and (8), the conclusion holds
Case: P-C-Pair where c1 = skip and c2 is not skip. Similar for the symmetric case.
We show for i = 2, j = 1.
By assumption and Lemma 19
(1) κ2 ⊲ (ιpc g ι2) (д gc дpc), ⌊δ⌋2 / c2
α
−→ κ ′2 ⊲ (ιpc g ι2) (д gc дpc), ⌊δ
′⌋2 / c
′
2,
and κ1 = κ ′1, ⌊δ⌋1 = ⌊δ
′⌋1
By projection of commands
(2) ⌊ιpc дpc, δ / 〈κ1, ι1, skip | κ2, ι2, c2〉д⌋1 = κ1 ⊲ (ιpc g ι1) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋1 / skip
(3) ⌊ιpc дpc, δ ′ / 〈κ1, ι1, skip | κ ′2, ι2, c
′
2〉д⌋1 = κ1 ⊲ (ιpc g ι1) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ
′⌋1 / skip
(4) ⌊ιpc дpc, δ / 〈κ1, ι1, skip | κ2, ι2, c2〉д⌋2 = κ2 ⊲ (ιpc g ι2) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋2 / {c2}
(5) ⌊ιpc дpc, δ ′ / 〈κ1, ι1, skip | κ ′2, ι2, c
′
2〉д⌋2 = κ
′
2 ⊲ (ιpc g ι2) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ
′⌋2 / {c
′
2}
By P-Pc
(6)
κ, δ / c
α
−→ κ ′, δ ′ / c ′
κ ⊲ ιpc дpc, δ / {c}
α
−→ κ ′ ⊲ ιpc дpc , δ
′ / {c ′}
By (1), (4), (5) and (6)
(7) κ2 ⊲ (ιpc g ι2) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋2 / {c2}
α
−→ κ ′2 ⊲ (ιpc g ι2) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ
′⌋2 / {c
′
2}
By (1), (2), (3)
(8) κ1 ⊲ (ιpc g ι1) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋1 / skip = κ1 ⊲ (ιpc g ι1) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ ′⌋1 / skip
By (7) and (8), the conclusion holds
Case: P-Skip-Pair
By projection of commands
(1) ⌊ιpc дpc, δ / 〈∅, ι1, skip | ∅, ι2, skip〉д⌋i = (ιpc g ιi ) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋i / {skip}
By definition of P-Pop
(2) ιpc дpc ⊲ κ, δ / {skip} −→ κ, δ / skip
By (1), (2)
(3) ⌊ιpc дpc, δ / 〈∅, ι1, skip | ∅, ι2, skip〉д⌋i −→ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋i / skip
By (3) and projection of commands, the conclusion holds
Case: P-Lift-If
By P-Lift-If
(1) ιpc дpc , δ / if 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉д then c1 else c2 −→ ιpc дpc, δ / 〈∅, ι1, c j | ∅, ι2, ck 〉д
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By projection of commands
(2) ⌊ιpc дpc, δ / if 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉д then c1 else c2⌋i = ιpc дpc , ⌊δ⌋i / if (ιi ui )д then c1 else c2
(3) ⌊ιpc дpc, δ / 〈∅, ι1, c j | ∅, ι2, ck 〉д⌋1 = (ιpc g ι1) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋1 / {c j }
where c j is c1 if u1 = true and c j is c2 if u1 = false
(4) ⌊ιpc дpc, δ / 〈∅, ι1, c j | ∅, ι2, ck 〉д⌋2 = (ιpc g ι2) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋2 / {ck }
where ck is c1 if u2 = true and c j is c2 if u2 = false
By P-If
(5) ιpc дpc , ⌊δ⌋1 / if(ι1 u1)д then c1 else c2 −→ (ιpc g ι1) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc , ⌊δ⌋1 / {c j }
where c j is c1 if u1 = true and c j is c2 if u1 = false
(6) ιpc дpc , ⌊δ⌋2 / if(ι2 u2)д then c1 else c2 −→ (ιpc g ι2) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc , ⌊δ⌋2 / {ck }
where ck is c1 if u2 = true and ck is c2 if u2 = false
By (2-6), the conclusion holds

Theorem 2 (Soundness). If κ, δ / c
T
−→∗ κ ′, δ ′ / c ′ where ⊢ κ, δ / c wf,
then ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊κ, δ / c⌋i
⌊T⌋i
−→∗ ⌊κ ′, δ ′ / c ′⌋i ,
Proof. By induction on the number of steps in the sequence. Base case follows from assumption.
Inductive Case: Holds for n steps; To show for n + 1 steps, i.e.,
if κ, δ / c
T
−→n κ ′, δ ′ / c ′
α
−→ κ ′′, δ ′′ / c ′′,
then ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊κ, δ / c⌋i
Ti
−→j κ0i , δ0i / c0i
αi
−→ κ1i , δ1i / c1i , such that ⌊κ ′′, δ ′′ /c
′′⌋i =
κ1i , δ1i / c1i
By induction hypothesis,
(1) ∀i ∈ {1, 2},κ0i , δ0i / c0i = ⌊κ ′, δ ′ / c ′⌋i and Ti = ⌊T⌋i
By Lemma 21, Lemma 6, (1) and projection of traces, the conclusion holds

F COMPLETENESS OF PAIRED-EXECUTION
Lemma 22 (Expression Completeness). If ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊δ⌋i / e ⇓ vi , then ∃v
′ s.t. δ / e ⇓ v ′
with ⌊v ′⌋i = vi
Proof. By induction on the structure of the expression-evaluation derivation.
Case: P-Const
By P-Const and projection of values
Case: P-Var
By assumption
(1) vi = rd ⌊δ⌋i (x) and v ′ = rd δ (x)
By (1) and Lemma 7,
(2) ⌊rd δ (x)⌋i = rd ⌊δ⌋i (x) and ⌊v ′⌋i = vi
Case: P-Bop
(1)
⌊δ⌋i / e1 ⇓ v1i ⌊δ⌋i / e2 ⇓ v2i vi = v1i bop v2i
⌊δ⌋i / e1 bop e2 ⇓ vi
By (1) and IH
(2) δ / e1 ⇓ v1, δ / e2 ⇓ v2, v1i = ⌊v1⌋i and v2i = ⌊v2⌋i
T.S. ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊v1 bop v2⌋i = ⌊v1⌋i bop ⌊v2⌋i
We show for i = 1, the proof is similar for i = 2
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Subcase I: v1 = 〈ι1 u1 | ι
′
1 u
′
1〉
д1 , v2 = 〈ι2 u2 | ι′2 u
′
2〉
д2
By definition of bop,
(I1) v1 bop v2 = 〈ι u | _〉д and ⌊v1 bop v2⌋1 = (ι u)д
where ι = ι1 g ι2, u = u1 bop u2 and д = д1 gc д2
By value-projection definition
(I2) ⌊v1⌋1 = (ι1 u1)д and ⌊v2⌋1 = (ι2 u2)д
By (I2) and definition of bop,
(I3) ⌊v1⌋1 bop ⌊v2⌋1 = (ι u)д where ι = ι1 g ι2, u = u1 bop u2 and д = д1 gc д2
By (I1) and (I3), the conclusion holds
Subcase II: v1 = 〈ι1 u1 | ι
′
1 u
′
1〉
д1 , v2 = (ι2 u2)д2 , similarly for v1 = (ι1 u1)д1 , v2 = 〈ι2 u2 | ι′2 u
′
2〉д2 ,
By definition of bop,
(II1) v1 bop v2 = 〈ι u | _〉д and ⌊v1 bop v2⌋1 = (ι u)д
where ι = ι1 g ι2, u = u1 bop u2 and д = д1 gc д2
By value-projection definition
(II2) ⌊v1⌋1 = (ι1 u1)д and ⌊v2⌋1 = (ι2 u2)д
By (II2) and definition of bop,
(II3) ⌊v1⌋1 bop ⌊v2⌋1 = (ι u)д where ι = ι1 g ι2, u = u1 bop u2 and д = д1 gc д2
By (II1) and (II3), the conclusion holds
Subcase III: v1 = (ι1 u1)
д1 , v2 = (ι2 u2)д2
By definition of bop,
(III1) v1 bop v2 = (ι u)д and ⌊v1 bop v2⌋1 = (ι u)д
where ι = ι1 g ι2, u = u1 bop u2 and д = д1 gc д2
By value-projection definition
(III2) ⌊v1⌋1 = (ι1 u1)д and ⌊v2⌋1 = (ι2 u2)д
By (III2) and definition of bop,
(III3) ⌊v1⌋1 bop ⌊v2⌋1 = (ι u)д where ι = ι1 g ι2, u = u1 bop u2 and д = д1 gc д2
By (III1) and (III3), the conclusion holds
Case: P-Cast
(1)
⌊δ⌋i / e ⇓ vi v
′
i = (E,д) ⊲ vi
⌊δ⌋i / E
дe ⇓ v ′i
By IH and (1)
(2) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, δ / e ⇓ v and ⌊v⌋i = vi
We show for i = 1, the proof is similar for i = 2
Subcase I: v = 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉
д′ ,
By definition of ⊲ cast operation,
(I1) v ′ = 〈ι′1 u1 | ι
′
2 u2〉
д and ⌊v ′⌋1 = (ι′1 u1)
д where ι′1 = ι1 ⊲⊳ E
By value-projection definition and cast operation,
(I2) ⌊v⌋1 = (ι1 u1)д
′
and v ′1 = (ι
′′
1 u1)
д where ι′′1 = ι1 ⊲⊳ E
By (I1) and (I2), the conclusion holds
Subcase II: v = (ι u)д
′
,
By definition of cast
(II1) v ′ = (ι′ u)д and ⌊v ′⌋1 = (ι′ u)д where ι′ = ι ⊲⊳ E
By definition of value-projection and cast
(II2) ⌊v⌋1 = (ι u)д
′
and v ′′1 = (ι
′′ u)д where ι′′ = ι ⊲⊳ E
By (II1) and (II2), ⌊v ′⌋1 = v ′′1

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Lemma 23. If ⊢ κ, δ / c wf and c does not contain pairs or braces, then ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊κ, δ / c⌋i =
κ, ⌊δ⌋i / c
Proof (sketch). By induction on the structure of c . Most cases use the projection of commands
and respective rules. c1; c2 use the IH additionally. 
Lemma 24. If ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊κ, δ / c⌋i
αi
−→ κ ′i , δ
′
i / c
′
i or ⌊κ, δ / c⌋i = κ0, δ0 / skip, and ⊢ κ, δ / c wf
then ∃κ ′, δ ′, c ′ s.t. κ, δ / c
T
−→∗ κ ′, δ ′ / c ′ with ⌊κ ′, δ ′ / c ′⌋i = κ
′
i , δ
′
i / c
′
i and ⌊T⌋i = αi
Proof. By induction on the structure of c . If ⌊κ, δ / c⌋1 = κ0, δ0 / skip and ⌊κ, δ / c⌋2 = κ0, δ0 /
skip, then c = skip (from the projection of command-configurations). If c = skip, then κ, δ / c
takes 0 steps and the conclusion follows from the assumption. If at least one of the projected runs
steps:
Case: c = c1; c2
By projection of commands,
(1)
⌊κ, δ / c1⌋i = κi , δi / c1i
⌊κ, δ / c1; c2⌋i = κi , δi / c1i ; c2
By P-Seq
(2)
κi , δi / c1i
αi
−→ κ ′i , δ
′
i / c
′
1i
κi , δi / c1i ; c2
αi
−→ κ ′i , δ
′
i / c
′
1i ; c2
By (2),
(3) ⌊κ, δ / c1⌋i
αi
−→ κ ′i , δ
′
i / c
′
1i
By (3) and IH,
(4) κ, δ / c1
T
−→∗ κ ′, δ ′ / c ′1 and ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊κ
′, δ ′ / c ′1⌋i = κ
′
i , δ
′
i / c
′
1i and ⌊T⌋i = αi , (or)
⌊κ, δ / c1⌋i = κ0, δ0 / skip
By (1), (2), (4)
(5) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊κ ′, δ ′ / c ′1; c2⌋i = κ
′
i , δ
′
i / c
′
1i ; c2, and ⌊T⌋i = αi
By (5), the conclusion holds
Case: c = {c}
By projection of commands,
(1)
⌊κ, δ / c⌋i = κi , δi / ci
⌊κ ⊲ ιpc дpc, δ / {c}⌋i = κi ⊲ ιpc дpc, δi / {ci }
By P-Pc,
(2)
κi , δi / ci
αi
−→ κ ′i , δ
′
i / c
′
i
κi ⊲ ιpc дpc, δi / {ci }
αi
−→ κ ′i ⊲ ιpc дpc, δ
′
i / {c
′
i }
By (2), IH,
(3) κ, δ / c
T
−→∗ κ ′, δ ′ / c ′ and ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊κ ′, δ ′ / c ′⌋i = κ ′i , δ
′
i / c
′
i and ⌊T⌋i = αi ,
By (1), (2) and (3), the conclusion holds
Case: c = skip; c
By projection of commands,
(1)
⌊ιpc дpc, δ / skip⌋i = ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋i / skip
⌊ιpc дpc, δ / skip; c⌋i = ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋i / skip; c
By P-Skip,
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(2) ιpc дpc , ⌊δ⌋i / skip; c −→ ιpc дpc , ⌊δ⌋i / c
(3) ιpc дpc , δ / skip; c −→ ιpc дpc, δ / c
T.S. ⌊ιpc дpc, δ / c⌋i = ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋i / c
(4) From well-formedness definition, c does not contain pairs or braces
From Lemma 23 and (4), the conclusion holds
Case: c = {skip}
By projection of commands,
(1)
⌊ι д, δ / skip⌋i = ι д, ⌊δ⌋i / skip
⌊ι д ⊲ ιpc дpc , δ / {skip}⌋i = ι д ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋i / {skip}
The rule forces κ = ι д
By P-Pop,
(2) ι д ⊲ ιpc дpc, δ / {skip} −→ ιpc дpc , δ / skip
(3) ι д ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋i / {skip} −→ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋i / skip
By (1), (2) and (3), the conclusion holds
Case: c = if(ι b)д then c1 else c2
By projection of commands,
(1) ⌊ιpc дpc, δ / if (ι b)
д then c1 else c2⌋i = ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋i / if (ι b)
д then c1 else c2
By P-If,
(2)
ι′pc = ιpc g ι д
′
pc = дpc gc д c j = c1 if b = true c j = c2 if b = false
ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋i / if (ι b)
д then c1 else c2 −→ ι
′
pc д
′
pc ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋i / {c j }
(3)
ι′pc = ιpc g ι д
′
pc = дpc gc д c j = c1 if b = true c j = c2 if b = false
ιpc дpc , δ / if (ι b)
д then c1 else c2 −→ ι
′
pc д
′
pc ⊲ ιpc дpc, δ / {c j }
Suppose b = true. Similar for b = false
T.S. ⌊ι′pc д
′
pc ⊲ ιpc дpc, δ / {c1}⌋i = ι
′
pc д
′
pc ⊲ ιpc дpc , ⌊δ⌋i / {c1}
By projection of commands,
(4)
⌊ι′pc д
′
pc, δ / c1⌋i = ι
′
pc д
′
pc , δ
′ / c ′1
⌊ι′pc д
′
pc ⊲ ιpc дpc , δ / {c1}⌋i = ι
′
pc д
′
pc ⊲ ιpc дpc, δ
′ / {c ′1}
(5) By well-formedness definition, c1 does not contain pairs or braces.
By Lemma 23 and (5), the conclusion holds
Case: c = whileX e do c
By projection of commands and P-While
Case: c = x := e
By projection of commands,
T.S. ⌊δ ′⌋i = δ ′i where δ
′
i = ⌊δ⌋i [x 7→ upd ⌊δ⌋i (x) v
′
i ] and δ
′
= δ [x 7→ upd δ (x) v ′]
By Lemma 22
(1) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, if ⌊δ⌋i / e ⇓ vi , then δ / e ⇓ v such that ⌊v⌋i = vi ,
By (1), Lemma 10,
(2) ⌊v ′⌋i = ⌊refineUB(ιpc,v)⌋i = refineUB(ιpc, ⌊v⌋i ) = v ′i
By (2), Lemma 8 and 7
(3) ⌊v ′′⌋i = ⌊upd δ (x) v ′⌋i = upd ⌊δ⌋i (x) ⌊v ′⌋i = v ′′i
(4) δ ′(x) = v ′′ and δ ′i (x) = v
′′
i
By (3) and (4) the conclusion holds
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Case: c = ifX e then c1 else c2
By projection of commands,
T.S. ⌊δ ′⌋i = δ ′i where δ
′
i = refineWSet(⌊δ⌋i ,X , ιpc,vi ) and δ
′
= refineWSet(δ ,X , ιpc,v)
By Lemma 22
(1) ⌊v⌋i = vi ,
By (1), Lemma 15,
(2) ⌊refineWSet(δ ,X , ιpc,v)⌋i = refineWSet(⌊δ⌋i ,X , ιpc, ⌊v⌋i )
By (1), (2), the conclusion holds
Case: c = output(ℓ, e)
By projection of commands, ⌊ιpc дpc, δ / skip⌋i = ιpc дpc , ⌊δ⌋i / skip.
T.S. ⌊(ℓ,v ′′)⌋i = (ℓ,v ′′i )
By Lemma 22
(1) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, if ⌊δ⌋i / e ⇓ vi , then δ / e ⇓ v such that ⌊v⌋i = vi ,
By (1), Lemma 9,
(2) ⌊v ′⌋i = ⌊refineLB(v, [ℓ, ℓ])⌋i = refineLB(⌊v⌋i , [ℓ, ℓ]) = v ′i
By (2), Lemma 10
(3) ⌊v ′′⌋i = ⌊refineUB(ιpc,v ′)⌋i = refineUB(ιpc, ⌊v ′⌋i ) = v ′′i
By (3) and projection of traces, the conclusion holds
Case: c = 〈κ1, ι1, c1 | κ2, ι2, c2〉 where c1 and c2 are not skip
By projection of commands
(1) ⌊ιpc дpc, δ / 〈κ1, ι1, c1 | κ2, ι2, c2〉д⌋i = κi ⊲ (ιpc g ιi ) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc , ⌊δ⌋i / {ci }
By assumption, P-Pc and (1)
(2) κi ⊲ (ιpc g ιi ) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋i / {ci }
αi
−→ κ ′′i ⊲ ιpc дpc, δ
′′
i / {c
′′
i }
(3) κi ⊲ (ιpc g ιi ) (дpc gc д), ⌊δ⌋i / ci
αi
−→ κ ′′i , δ
′′
i / c
′′
i
Suppose i = 1, j = 2 followed by i = 2, j = 1. Similar for the symmetric case
(4) ιpc дpc , δ / 〈κ1, ι1, c1 | κ2, ι2, c2〉д
α ′
−→ ιpc дpc, δ
′ / 〈κ ′1, ι1, c
′
1 | κ2, ι2, c2〉д
α ′′
−→ ιpc дpc, δ
′′ / 〈κ ′1, ι1, c
′
1 | κ
′
2, ι2, c
′
2〉д
By (4), Lemma 19,
(5) κ1 ⊲ (ιpc g ι1 дpc gc д), ⌊δ⌋1 / c1
⌊α ′ ⌋1
−→ κ ′1 ⊲ (ιpc g ι1 дpc gc д), ⌊δ
′⌋1 / c
′
1,
⌊δ⌋2 = ⌊δ
′⌋2 and ⌊α ′⌋2 = ·
(6) κ2 ⊲ (ιpc g ι2 дpc gc д), ⌊δ ′⌋2 / c2
⌊α ′′⌋2
−→ κ ′2 ⊲ (ιpc g ι2 дpc gc д), ⌊δ
′′⌋2 / c
′
2,
⌊δ ′⌋1 = ⌊δ
′′⌋1 and ⌊α ′′⌋1 = ·
(7) ιpc дpc , δ / 〈κ1, ι1, c1 | κ2, ι2, c2〉д
α ′,α ′′
−→∗ ιpc дpc , δ
′′ / 〈κ ′1, ι1, c
′
1 | κ
′
2, ι2, c
′
2〉д
T.S. ⌊ιpc дpc, δ ′′ / 〈κ ′1, ι1, c
′
1 | κ
′
2, ι2, c
′
2〉д⌋i = κ
′′
i ⊲ ιpc дpc, δ
′′
i / {c
′′
i } and ⌊α
′,α ′′⌋i = αi
By projection of commands,
(8) ⌊ιpc дpc, δ ′′ / 〈κ ′1, ι1, c
′
1 | κ
′
2, ι2, c
′
2〉д⌋i = κ
′
i ⊲ (ιpc g ιi ) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc , ⌊δ
′′⌋i / {c
′
i }
By (8), T.S. κ ′i ⊲ (ιpc g ιi ) (дpc gc д) = κ
′′
i , ⌊δ
′′⌋i = δ
′′, c ′i = c
′′
i and ⌊α
′,α ′′⌋i = αi
By (3), (5), (6)
(9) κ ′′1 = κ
′
1 ⊲ (ιpc g ι1) (дpc gc д), δ
′′
1 = ⌊δ
′⌋1, c ′1 = c
′′
1 , α1 = ⌊α
′⌋1
(10) κ ′′2 = κ
′
2 ⊲ (ιpc g ι2) (дpc gc д), δ
′′
2 = ⌊δ
′′⌋2, c ′2 = c
′′
2 , α2 = ⌊α
′′⌋2
By (5), (6), (9), (10) and projection of traces, the conclusion holds
Case: c = 〈κ1, ι1, c1 | κ2, ι2, c2〉 where c1 = skip and c2 is not. Similar for c2 = skip and c1 , skip
By projection of commands
(1) ⌊ιpc дpc, δ / 〈κ1, ι1, skip | κ2, ι2, c2〉д⌋1 = κ1 ⊲ (ιpc g ι1) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋1 / skip
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(2) ⌊ιpc дpc, δ / 〈κ1, ι1, skip | κ2, ι2, c2〉д⌋2 = κ2 ⊲ (ιpc g ι2) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋2 / {c2}
(1) does not proceed as the projection of c gives skip
By assumption, P-Pc and (2)
(3) κ2 ⊲ (ιpc g ι2) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋2 / {c2}
α2
−→ κ ′′2 ⊲ ιpc дpc, δ
′′
2 / {c
′′
2 }
(4) κ2 ⊲ (ιpc g ι2) (дpc gc д), ⌊δ⌋2 / c2
α2
−→ κ ′′2 , δ
′′
2 / c
′′
2
Suppose i = 2, j = 1.
(5) ιpc дpc , δ / 〈κ1, ι1, skip | κ2, ι2, c2〉д
α ′
−→ ιpc дpc, δ
′ / 〈κ1, ι1, skip | κ
′
2, ι
′
2, c
′
2〉д
By Lemma 19,
(6) κ2 ⊲ (ιpc g ι2 дpc gc д), ⌊δ⌋2 / c2
⌊α ′ ⌋2
−→ κ ′2 ⊲ (ιpc g ι2 дpc gc д), ⌊δ
′⌋2 / c
′
2,
⌊δ ′⌋1 = ⌊δ⌋1 and ⌊α ′⌋1 = ·
T.S. ⌊ιpc дpc, δ ′ / 〈κ1, ι1, skip | κ ′2, ι2, c
′
2〉д⌋1 = κ1 ⊲ (ιpc g ι1) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋1 / skip and
⌊ιpc дpc , δ
′ / 〈κ1, ι1, skip | κ
′
2, ι2, c
′
2〉д⌋2 = κ
′′
2 ⊲ ιpc дpc , δ
′′
2 / {c
′′
2 } and ⌊α
′⌋1 = · and ⌊α ′⌋2 = α2
By projection of commands,
(7) ⌊ιpc дpc, δ ′ / 〈κ1, ι1, skip | κ ′2, ι2, c
′
2〉д⌋1 = κ1 ⊲ (ιpc g ι1) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ
′⌋1 / skip
(8) ⌊ιpc дpc, δ ′ / 〈κ1, ι1, skip | κ ′2, ι2, c
′
2〉д⌋2 = κ
′
2 ⊲ (ιpc g ι2) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ
′⌋2 / {c
′
2}
By (8), T.S. κ ′2 ⊲ (ιpc g ι2) (дpc gc д) = κ
′′
2 , ⌊δ
′⌋2 = δ
′′, c ′2 = c
′′
2 and ⌊α
′⌋2 = α2
By (4) and (6)
(9) κ ′′2 = κ
′
2 ⊲ (ιpc g ι2) (дpc gc д), δ
′′
= ⌊δ ′⌋2, c ′2 = c
′′
2 , α2 = ⌊α
′⌋2
By (6), (7), (9) and projection of traces, the conclusion holds
Case: c = 〈∅, ι1, skip | ∅, ι2, skip〉
By projection of commands
(1) ⌊ιpc дpc, δ / 〈∅, ι1, skip | ∅, ι2, skip〉д⌋i = (ιpc g ιi ) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋i / {skip}
(2) ⌊ιpc дpc, δ / skip⌋i = ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋i / skip
By (1) and definition of P-Pop
(3) (ιpc g ιi ) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋i / {skip} −→ ιpc дpc , ⌊δ⌋i / skip
By (2) and (3), the conclusion holds
Case: c = if 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉
д then c1 else c2
By P-Lift-If
(1) ⌊ιpc дpc, δ / if 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉д then c1 else c2⌋i −→ ⌊ιpc дpc, δ / 〈∅, ι1, c j | ∅, ι2, ck 〉д⌋i
By projection of commands
(2) ⌊ιpc дpc, δ / if 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉д then c1 else c2⌋i = ιpc дpc , ⌊δ⌋i / if (ιi ui )д then c1 else c2
(3) ⌊ιpc дpc, δ / 〈∅, ι1, c j | ∅, ι2, ck 〉д⌋1 = (ιpc g ι1) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋1 / {c j }
where c j is c1 if u1 = true and c j is c2 if u1 = false
(4) ⌊ιpc дpc, δ / 〈∅, ι1, c j | ∅, ι2, ck 〉д⌋2 = (ιpc g ι2) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc, ⌊δ⌋2 / {ck }
where ck is c1 if u2 = true and c j is c2 if u2 = false
By P-If
(5) ιpc дpc , ⌊δ⌋1 / if(ι1 u1)д then c1 else c2 −→ (ιpc g ι1) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc , ⌊δ⌋1 / {c j }
where c j is c1 if u1 = true and c j is c2 if u1 = false
(6) ιpc дpc , ⌊δ⌋2 / if(ι2 u2)д then c1 else c2 −→ (ιpc g ι2) (дpc gc д) ⊲ ιpc дpc , ⌊δ⌋2 / {ck }
where ck is c1 if u2 = true and ck is c2 if u2 = false
By (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), the conclusion holds

Theorem 3 (Completeness). If ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊κ, δ / c⌋i
Ti
−→∗ κi , δi / skip and ⊢ κ, δ / c wf, then
∃κ ′, δ ′ s.t. κ, δ / c
T
−→∗ κ ′, δ ′ / skip with ⌊κ ′, δ ′ / skip⌋i = κi , δi / skip and ⌊T⌋i = Ti
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Proof. Suppose ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊κ, δ / c⌋i
Ti
−→ni κi , δi / skip. By induction over the number of
steps n1,n2 in the two runs.
Base Case:
(1) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊κ, δ / c⌋i = κi , δi / skip
By (1)
(2) c = skip and ⌊δ⌋i = δi
By assumption
(3) κ, δ / c = κ ′, δ ′ / skip
By (2), (3)
(4) ⌊κ ′, δ ′ / skip⌋i = κi , δi / skip
Inductive Case:
By assumption
(1) ⌊κ, δ / c⌋i
αi
−→ κ ′i , δ
′
i / c
′
i or ⌊κ, δ / c⌋i ends in skip and doesn’t step
By Lemma 24,
(2) ∃κ0, δ0, c0.κ, δ / c
T
′
−→∗ κ0, δ0 / c0
By (1), (2), and Theorem 2,
(3) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ⌊κ0, δ0 / c0⌋i = κ ′i , δ
′
i / c
′
i and ⌊T
′⌋i = αi
Conclusion follows by IH

G PRESERVATION
We define the following constraints on configurations to facilitate proofs related to paired values
and commands. We start by defining ι ∈ H (ℓA), Π ∈ H (ℓA) and κ ∈ H (ℓA) for any observer at level
ℓA.
ι = [ℓl , ℓr ] ℓl $ ℓA
ι ∈ H (ℓA)
ι-H
Π = 〈ι1 | ι2〉 ιi ∈ H (ℓA) where i ∈ {1, 2}
Π ∈ H (ℓA)
Π-H
κ = ι д ⊲ κ ′ ι ∈ H (ℓA) (κ
′ ∈ H (ℓA) ∨ κ
′
= ∅)
κ ∈ H (ℓA)
κ-H
We say a configuration is safe (written ⊢ κ, δ /i c sf for i ∈ {·, 1, 2}) if all of the following hold
(1) if i ∈ {1, 2}, then κ ∈ H (ℓA), ∀x ∈ WtSet(c), intvl (δ (x)) ∈ H (ℓA)
(2) if c = if 〈_ | _〉 then c1 else c2, then ∀x ∈ WtSet(c), intvl (δ (x)) ∈ H (ℓA)
(3) if c = 〈κ1, ι1, c1 | κ2, ι2, c2〉д , then ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ιi ⊢ д ∈ H (ℓA), and ∀x ∈ WtSet(c), intvl (δ (x)) ∈
H (ℓA)
Lemma 25 (Interval refine). ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, refine(ι1, ι2) ⊑ ιi
Proof (sketch). By examining the definitions of the operations. 
Lemma 26 (Join refine). ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ιi ⊑ γ (дi ) imply ι1 g ι2 ⊑ γ (д1 gc д2).
Proof (sketch). By examining the definitions of the operations. 
Lemma 27 (Evidence subtyping). E ⊢ д1 ≤ c д2, ι ⊑ γ (д1) imply ι ⊲⊳ E ⊑ γ (д2).
Proof.
Let E = (ι1, ι2). By inversion, ι2 ⊑ γ (д2),
By Lemma 25, ι ⊲⊳ E ⊑ ι2
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By ⊑ is transitive, ι ⊑ γ (д2),

Lemma 28 (Refinement maintains high label). ι1 ⊑ ι2 and ι2 ∈ H (ℓA) imply ι1 ∈ H (ℓA)
Proof (sketch). By examining the definitions of the operations. 
Lemma 29 (Consistent subtyping maintains high). ι ⊢ д ∈ H (ℓA), E ⊢ д 4 c д
′, and imply
ι ⊲⊳ E ⊢ д′ ∈ H (ℓA)
Proof.
By inversion, ι = [ℓl , ℓr ], ℓl $ ℓA ι ⊑ γ (д)
Assume ι ⊲⊳ E = (ℓx , ℓy),
By the definition of ι ⊲⊳ E, ℓl 4 ℓx
Therefore, ℓx $ ℓA
By Lemma 27, ι ⊲⊳ E ⊑ γ (д′).
Therefore, ι ⊲⊳ E ⊢ д′ ∈ H (ℓA)

Lemma 30 (Join maintains high). ι ⊢ д ∈ H (ℓA), ι
′ ⊑ γ (д′) imply ι g ι′ ⊢ (д gc д
′) ∈ H (ℓA)
Proof.
By inversion, ι = [ℓl , ℓr ], ℓl $ ℓA, ι ⊑ γ (д)
Assume ι g ι′ = (ℓx , ℓy),
By the definition of ι g ι′, ℓl 4 ℓx
Therefore, ℓx $ ℓA
By Lemma 26, ι g ι′ ⊑ γ (д gc д′).
Therefore, ι g ι′ ⊢ д gc д′ ∈ H (ℓA)

Lemma 31 (Preservation (cast)). Γ ⊢ v : U1, E ⊢ U1 ≤ c U2 and U2 = τ
д′ imply Γ ⊢ (E,д′) ⊲ v :
U2.
Proof. By examining the definition of (E,д′) ⊲v .
Case: v = (ι u)д
By assumptions,
(1) ι′ = ι ⊲⊳ E and (E,д′) ⊲ v = (ι′ u)д
′
By inversion of typing of v
(2) U1 = τд , ι ⊑ γ (д)
By inversion of subtyping
(3) E ⊢ д ≤ c д′
By Lemma 27 on (1), (3)
(4) ι′ ⊑ γ (д′)
By applying the same typing rule using (4), the conclusion holds
Case: v = 〈ι1 u1 | ι1 u1〉
д
By assumptions,
(1) ι′i = ιi ⊲⊳ E (i ∈ {1, 2}) and (E,д
′) ⊲v = 〈ι′1 u1 | ι
′
2 u2〉
д′
By inversion of typing of v ,
(2) U1 = τд , and for all i ∈ {1, 2} ιi ⊑ γ (д), ιi ⊢ д ∈ H (ℓA)
By inversion of subtyping
(3) E ⊢ д ≤ c д′
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By Lemma 27 on (1), (3)
(4) ι′i ⊑ γ (д
′)
By Lemma 29
(5) ι′i ⊢ д
′ ∈ H (ℓA)
By applying the same typing rule using (4) and (5), the conclusion holds

Lemma 32 (Preservation (bop)). If ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, Γ ⊢ vi : τ
дi , then Γ ⊢ v1 bop v2 : τ
д1gcд2 .
Proof (sketch). By examining the definitions of v1 bop v2. Apply Lemma 26 and Lemma 30.

Lemma 33 (Preservation (expression)). If E :: δ /i e ⇓ v , ⊢ δ : Γ, and Γ ⊢ e , then Γ ⊢ v
Proof. By induction on the structure of E. The proof is straightforward when E ends in P-
Const or P-Var.
Case: E ends in P-Cast
By assumptions,
(1)
δ / e ⇓ v v ′ = (E,д′) ⊲v
δ / Eд
′
e ⇓ v ′
(2) ⊢ δ : Γ, and Γ ⊢ Eд
′
e : U2
By inversion of typing
(3) Γ ⊢ e : U1, E ⊢ U1 ≤ c U2 andU2 = τд
′
By I.H. on e
(4) Γ ⊢ v : U1
By Lemma 31, Γ ⊢ v ′ : U2
Case: E ends in P-Bop
By assumptions,
(1)
δ /i e1 ⇓ v1 δ /i e2 ⇓ v2 v = v1 bop v2
δ /i e1 bop e2 ⇓ v
(2) ⊢ δ : Γ, and Γ ⊢ e1 bop e2 : U
By inversion of typing, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}
(3) Γ ⊢ ei : τдi , andU = τд1gcд2
By I.H. on ei
(4) Γ ⊢ vi : τдi
By Lemma 32, Γ ⊢ v : U

Lemma 34 (PC refinement). If Γ; ιpc дpc ⊢ c , and ι ⊑ ιpc , then Γ; ι дpc ⊢ c .
Proof (sketch). By induction over the typing derivation of c . 
Lemma 35. If ⊢ v : τд , refineUBi (Π,v) = v
′, and when i ∈ {1, 2} or Π = 〈ι | ι′〉, Π ∈ H (ℓA), then
⊢ v ′ : τд and intvl (v ′) ∈ H (ℓA) when i ∈ 1, 2.
Proof. By examining all the rules. Use Lemma 25 to show that the resulting intervals are still
H. 
Lemma 36. If ⊢ v : τд , refineLB(v, ι) = v ′, then ⊢ v ′ : τд and intvl (v ′) ⊑ ι.
Proof (sketch). By examining all the rules. Use Lemma 25. 
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Lemma 37. If ⊢ δ : Γ and rfLi (δ ,X ,Π) = δ
′ and when i ∈ {1, 2} or Π = 〈ι | ι′〉, Π ∈ H (ℓA), then
⊢ δ ′ : Γ and when Π ∈ H (ℓA), ∀x ∈ X , intvl (δ
′(x)) ∈ H (ℓA)
Proof. By induction over the size of X and apply Lemma 35. 
Lemma 38. If ⊢ δ : Γ, δ ′ = refineWSeti (δ ,X , ιpc,v), and when i ∈ {1, 2}, ιpc ∈ H (ℓA) then ⊢ δ
′ : Γ
and when ιpc ∈ H (ℓA) or intvl (v) ∈ H (ℓA), ∀x ∈ X , intvl (δ
′(x)) ∈ H (ℓA).
Proof. Follows from Lemma 37. 
Lemma 39. If ⊢ vn : τ
д , ⊢ vo : τ
д , and when i ∈ {1, 2}, intvl (vo) ∈ H (ℓA) and intvl (vn) ∈ H (ℓA),
then ⊢ updi vo vn : τ
д
Proof. By examining the definition of updi vo vn
Case: upd vo vn where either vo or vn is a pair
By inversion of typing rules, intvl (vo) ∈ H (ℓA) or intvl (vn) ∈ H (ℓA)
By Lemma 25 and Lemma 28, intvl (upd vo vn) ∈ H (ℓA)
Therefore V-Pair applies and ⊢ upd vo vn : τд
Case: upd vo vn where neither vo nor vn is a pair
We use Lemma 25 and transitivity of ⊑ and apply value typing rule directly.
Case: updi vo vn , where i ∈ {1, 2}
By assumption, intvl (vo) ∈ H (ℓA) and intvl (vn) ∈ H (ℓA)
By Lemma 25 and Lemma 28, the updated value’s interval is in H (ℓA)
Therefore V-Pair applies and ⊢ updi vo vn : τ
д

Lemma 40 (Preservation one-step). If E :: κ, δ /i c
α
−→ κ ′, δ ′ /i c
′, ⊢ δ : Γ and D :: Γ;κ ⊢r c ,
and ⊢ κ, δ /i c sf then ⊢ δ
′ : Γ, Γ;κ ′ ⊢r c
′, ⊢ α , and ⊢ κ ′, δ ′ /i c
′ sf
Proof. By induction on the structure of c
Case: c = skip
There is no rule to step skip, so the conclusion holds trivially.
Case: c = c1; c2
By inversion of D
(1) κ = κ ′ ⊲ ιpc дpc , Γ; ιpc дpc ⊢ c2, and Γ;κ ⊢r c1 or (Γ; ιpc дpc ⊢ c1 and κ = ιpc дpc )
By examining E, there are two cases: P-Seq or P-Skip applies
Subcase I: E ends in P-Seq
By assumption
(I2)
κ, δ /i c1
α
−→ κ ′, δ ′ /i c
′
1
κ, δ /i c1; c2
α
−→ κ ′, δ ′ /i c
′
1; c2
By I.H. on c1
(I3) ⊢ δ ′ : Γ, Γ;κ ′ ⊢r c ′1 and ⊢ α
By Lemma 18, (I3), (1), either R-End or R-C-Seq applies
(I4) Γ;κ ′ ⊢r c ′1; c2
Subcase II: E ends in P-Skip
(II2) κ, δ /i skip; c2 −→ κ, δ /i c2
By (1) and c1 = skip
(II3) κ = ιpc дpc
By (1) and (II3) and R-End
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(II4) Γ;κ ⊢r c2
Case: c = x := e
By inversion of D
(1) κ = ιpc дpc , Γ ⊢ x : τд , Γ ⊢ e : τд , and дpc 4 c д
By examining E, only P-Assign applies
(2)
δ /i e ⇓ v
′ v ′′ = refineUB(ιpc,v
′) δ ′ = δ [x 7→ updi δ (x) v
′′]
ιpc дpc, δ /i x := e −→ ιpc дpc, δ
′ /i skip
By Lemma 33, Γ ⊢ v ′ : τд ,
By Lemma 35, Γ ⊢ v ′′ : τд , and intvl (v ′′) ∈ H (ℓA) when i ∈ 1, 2
By assumption, intvl (δ (x)) ∈ H (ℓA)
By Lemma 39, Γ ⊢ updi δ (x) v
′′ : τд
By store typing ⊢ δ ′ : Γ
Case: c = output(ℓ, e)
By inversion of D
(1) κ = ιpc дpc , Γ ⊢ e : τд , д 4 c ℓ, дpc 4 c ℓ
By examining E, only P-Out applies
(2)
δ /i e ⇓ v
′ v ′′ = refineLB(v ′, [ℓ, ℓ]) v1 = refineUB(ιpc,v
′′)
ιpc дpc , δ /i output(ℓ, e)
(i, ℓ,v1)
−→ ιpc дpc , δ /i skip
By Lemma 33
(3) Γ ⊢ v ′ : τд
By Lemma 36
(4) Γ ⊢ v ′′ : τд and intvl (v ′′) ⊑ [ℓ, ℓ]
By Lemma 35
(5) Γ ⊢ v1 : τд and intvl (v1) ∈ H (ℓA) when i ∈ {1, 2}
By (4) and intvl (v1) ⊑ intvl (v ′′)
(6) intvl (v1) 4 [ℓ, ℓ]
By T-A-*, ⊢ (i, ℓ,v1)
Case: c = ifX e thenc1 elsec2
By inversion of D
(1) κ = ιpc дpc , Γ ⊢ e : bool
дc , ιc = γ (дc ),
(2) Γ; ιpc g ιc дpc gc дc ⊢ ci , where i ∈ {1, 2} and
(3) X = WtSet(c1) ∪WtSet(c2)
By examining E, only P-If-Refine applies
(4)
δ /i e ⇓ v δ
′
= refineWSeti (δ ,X , ιpc,v)
ιpc дpc, δ /i if
X e then c1 else c2 −→ ιpc дpc, δ
′ /i if v then c1 else c2
By Lemma 33
(5) Γ ⊢ v : boolдc ,
By (1) and R-C-If
(6) Γ; ιpc дpc ⊢r if v then c1 else c2
By Lemma 38, ⊢ δ ′ : Γ
By ⊢ ιpc дpc, δ /i c : sf
(7) ιpc ∈ H (ℓA) when i ∈ {1, 2}
By Lemma 38,
(8) when i ∈ {1, 2} or intvl (v) ∈ H (ℓA), ∀x ∈ X , intvl (δ ′(x)) ∈ H (ℓA).
By sf definition, ⊢ ιpc дpc, δ ′ /i if v then c1 else c2 sf
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Case: c = ifv thenc1 elsec2
By inversion of D
(1) κ = ιpc дpc , Γ ⊢ e : bool
дc , ιc = γ (дc ), Γ; ιpc g ιc дpc gc дc ⊢ ci , where i ∈ {1, 2}
By examining E, there are three cases: P-Lift-If, P-If applies
Subcase I: v = (ι true)д
By assumption, v = (ι true)д
(I2)
ι′pc = ιpc g ι д
′
pc = дpc gc д
ιpc дpc, δ /i if (ι true)
д then c1 else c2 −→ ι
′
pc д
′
pc ⊲ ιpc дpc, δ /i {c1}
By inversion of typing for e
(I3) дc = д
By Lemma 34 and (I3), and (1)
(I4) Γ; ιpc g ι′c дpc gc дc ⊢ c1
By (I4) and R-Pop, Γ; ι′pc д
′
pc ⊲ ιpc дpc ⊢ {c1}.
Subcase II: v = (ι false)д , the proof is similar to the previous case.
Subcase III: E ends in P-Lift-If,
By assumption, v = 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉д
(III2)
i = {1, 2} c j = c1 if u1 = true
c j = c2 if u1 = false ck = c1 if u2 = true ck = c2 if u2 = false
ιpc дpc, δ / if 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉
д then c1 else c2 −→ ιpc дpc, δ / 〈∅, ι1, c j | ∅, ι2, ck 〉д
By inversion of typing for v
(III3) д = дc , ιi = γ (д), and ιi ⊢ д ∈ H (ℓA)
By similar arguments used in the previous subcase,
(III4) Γ; ιpc g ιi дpc gc дc ⊢ ci
By (III3), (III4) and R-C-Pair, Γ; ιpc дpc ⊢ 〈∅, ι1, c j | ∅, ι2, ck 〉д
By ⊢ ιpc дpc, δ /i c : sf
(III5) ∀x ∈ WtSet(ci ), intvl (δ (x)) ∈ H (ℓA)
By ιi ∈ H (ℓA),
(III6) ιi ∈ H (ℓA),
By (III5) and (III6), ⊢ ιpc дpc, δ / 〈∅, ι1, c j | ∅, ι2, ck 〉д : sf
Case: c = whileXe do c ′
By inversion of D
(1) κ = ιpc дpc , Γ ⊢ e : bool
д , ιc = γ (д), Γ; ιpc g ιc дpc gc д ⊢ c ′, X = WtSet(c ′)
By examining E, only P-While applies
(2) ιpc дpc, δ /i while
X e do c ′ −→ ιpc дpc , δ /i if
X e then (c ′;whileX e do c ′) else skip
To type the resulting if statement, we need to show the following:
Γ; ιpc g ιc дpc gc д ⊢ while
X e do c ′
Because expression typing does not use pc context and
g (gc ) the same interval (label) twice does not change the result,
the conclusion holds
Case: c = {c ′}
By inversion of D
(1) κ = κ1 ⊲ ιpc дpc , Γ;κ1 ⊢ c ′
By examining E, there are two cases: P-Pc or P-Pop applies
Subcase I: E ends in P-Pop
By c ′ = skip and (1)
(I2) κ1 = ι д
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By assumption
(I3) ι д ⊲ ιpc дpc , δ /i {skip} −→ ιpc дpc, δ /i skip
By G-Skip and R-End
(I4) Γ; ιpc дpc ⊢r skip
Subcase II: E ends in P-Pc
By assumption
(II2)
κ, δ /i c
α
−→ κ ′, δ ′ / c ′
κ ⊲ ιpc дpc, δ /i {c}
α
−→ κ ′ ⊲ ιpc дpc, δ
′ /i {c
′}
By I.H. on c
(II3) ⊢ δ ′ : Γ, Γ;κ ′ ⊢r c ′ and ⊢ α
By R-Pop
(II4) Γ;κ ′ ⊲ ιpc дpc ⊢r {c ′}
Case: c = 〈κ1, ι1, c1 | κ2, ι2, c2〉д
By inversion of D
(1) κ = ιpc дpc , Γ;κi ⊲ (ιpc g ιi ) (дpc gc д) ⊢r ci , and ιi ⊢ д ∈ H , for i ∈ {1, 2}
By examining E, there are two cases: P-Skip-Pair or P-C-Pair applies
Subcase I: E ends in P-Skip-Pair
(I2) κi = ∅
By assumption
(I3) ιpc дpc, δ / 〈∅, ι1, skip | ∅, ι2, skip〉д −→ ιpc дpc , δ / skip
By G-Skip and R-End
(I4) Γ; ιpc дpc ⊢r skip
Subcase II: E ends in P-C-Pair
By assumption
(II2)
κi ⊲ ιpc g ιi дpc gc д, δ /i ci
α
−→ κ ′i ⊲ ιpc g ιi дpc gc д, δ
′ /i c
′
i
c j = c
′
j κj = κ
′
j {i, j} = {1, 2}
ιpc дpc, δ / 〈κ1, ι1, c1 | κ2, ι2, c2〉д
α
−→ ιpc дpc, δ
′ / 〈κ ′1, ι1, c
′
1 | κ
′
2, ι2, c
′
2〉д
Assume c1 takes a step. The other case when c2 takes a step can be proven similarly.
By I.H. on c1
(II3) ⊢ δ ′ : Γ, Γ;κ ′ ⊲ ιpc g ιi дpc gc д ⊢r c ′1 and ⊢ α
By R-C-Pair, (II3), and (1)
(II4) Γ; ιpc дpc ⊢r 〈κ ′1, ι1, c
′
1 | κ
′
2, ι2, c
′
2〉д

Lemma 41. If κ, δ / c
α
−→ κ ′, δ ′ / c ′ with ⊢ κ, δ , c and ⊢ κ, δ / c sf, then ⊢ κ ′, δ ′, c ′ and
⊢ κ ′, δ ′ / c ′ sf and ⊢ α
Proof. Follows from Lemma 40 
Theorem 4 (Preservation). If κ, δ / c
T
−→∗ κ ′, δ ′ / c ′ with ⊢ κ, δ , c and ⊢ κ, δ / c sf, then
⊢ κ ′, δ ′, c ′ and ⊢ T
Proof. By induction on the number of steps in the sequence. Base case is trivial and follows
from assumption.
Inductive Case: Holds for n steps; To show for n + 1 steps, i.e., if κ, δ / c
T
−→n κ ′, δ ′ / c ′
α
−→
κ ′′, δ ′′ / c ′′, then ⊢ κ ′′, δ ′′, c ′′ and ⊢ T,α
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(IH) If κ, δ / c
T
−→n κ ′, δ ′ / c ′ with ⊢ κ, δ , c , then ⊢ κ ′, δ ′, c ′ and ⊢ T
By Lemma 41 and IH
(1) ⊢ κ ′′, δ ′′, c ′′ and ⊢ T and ⊢ α
By T-T-Ind, conclusion holds

H NONINTERFERENCE
We first define when a gradual label of an initial store location is not observable by the attacker.
Formally: д ∈ H (ℓA) iff д = ℓ and ℓ $ ℓA.
We define merging of two stores (δ1 ⊲⊳ δ2) as below:
Γ ⊢ · ⊲⊳ · = ·
MgS-Emp
Γ ⊢ δ1 ⊲⊳ δ2 = δ lab(Γ(x)) ∈ H (ℓA) vi = (ιi ui )
д(i ∈ {1, 2}
Γ ⊢ δ1, x 7→ v1 ⊲⊳ δ2, x 7→ v2 = δ , x 7→ 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉
д
MgS-H
Γ ⊢ δ1 ⊲⊳ δ2 = δ lab(Γ(x)) < H (ℓA) v1 = v2 = v
Γ ⊢ δ1, x 7→ v1 ⊲⊳ δ2, x 7→ v2 = δ , x 7→ v
MgS-L
Lemma 42. If ⊢ T then ⊢ ⌊T⌋1 ≈ℓA ⌊T⌋2
Proof. By induction on the structure of T. The base case is trivial.
Case: T = α ,T′
By inversion of ⊢ T
(1) ⊢ α and ⊢ T′
By I.H. on T′
(2) ⊢ ⌊T′⌋1 ≈ℓA ⌊T
′⌋2
By inversion of ⊢ α , we have two cases
Subcase I: α = (ℓ,v)
By projection rules
(I3) ⌊α ,T′⌋1 = α , ⌊T′⌋1, and ⌊α ,T′⌋2 = α , ⌊T′⌋2
By applying either EqT-L or EqT-H-l then EqT-H-r on (2), ⊢ ⌊T⌋1 ≈ℓA ⌊T⌋2
Subcase II: α = (i, ℓ,v), we show the case when i = 1, the other case when i = 2 is similar
By projection rules
(II3) ⌊α ,T′⌋1 = (ℓ,v), ⌊T′⌋1, and ⌊α ,T′⌋2 = ⌊T′⌋2
By typing of α
(II4) ⊢ ℓ $ ℓA
By (II4) and EqT-H-l and (2), ⊢ ⌊T⌋1 ≈ℓA ⌊T⌋2

Lemma 43. If ⊢ δ1 ≈ℓA δ2 : Γ then ∃δ s.t. Γ ⊢ δ1 ⊲⊳ δ2 = δ , ⊢ δ : Γ and ⌊δ⌋i = δi
Proof. By induction on the structure of the equivalence definition. Base case is trivial
Inductive Case: EqS-Ind.
By assumption
(1)
E1 ::⊢ δ1 ≈ℓA δ2 : Γ E2 ::⊢ v1 ≈ℓA v2 : U
⊢ δ1, x 7→ v1 ≈ℓA δ2, x 7→ v2 : Γ, x : U
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By I.H. on E1
(2) ∃δ s.t. Γ ⊢ δ1 ⊲⊳ δ2 = δ , ⊢ δ : Γ and ⌊δ⌋i = δi
By inversion of E2, there are two subcases:
Subcase I: E2 ends in EqV-L
By assumption
(I3) vi = (ι u)д , д 4 c ℓA, ι ⊑ γ (д) and ⊢ (ι u)д : U
By casing on д and (I3),
(I4) д < H (ℓA)
By MgS-L on (I3), (I4), (2)
(I5) Γ, x : U ⊢ δ1, x 7→ v1 ⊲⊳ δ2, x 7→ v1 = δ , x 7→ (ι u)д ,
By T-S-Ind, (2), and (I3)
(I6) ⊢ δ , x 7→ (ι u)д : Γ, x : U
Subcase II: E2 ends in EqV-H
By assumption
(II3) vi = (ιi ui )д , ιi ⊢ д ∈ H (ℓA), and ⊢ (ιi ui )д : U where i ∈ {1, 2}
By MgS-H on (II3), (2)
(II4) Γ, x : U ⊢ δ1, x 7→ v1 ⊲⊳ δ2, x 7→ v1 = δ , x 7→ 〈ι2 u2 | ι2 u2〉д ,
By T-S-Ind, (2), and (II3)
(II5) ⊢ δ , x 7→ 〈ι1 u1 | ι2 u2〉д : Γ, x : U

Theorem 5 (Noninterference). Given an adversary label ℓA, a program c , and two stores δ1, δ2,
s.t., ⊢ δ1 ≈ℓA δ2 : Γ, and Γ; [⊥,⊥] ⊥ ⊢ c , and ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, [⊥,⊥] ⊥, δi / c
Ti
−→∗ κi , δ
′
i / skip, then
⊢ T1 ≈ℓA T2.
Proof.
By assumptions and Lemma 43
(1) ∃δ s.t. Γ ⊢ δ1 ⊲⊳ δ2 = δ , ⊢ δ : Γ and ⌊δ⌋i = δi
By Completeness Theorem (Theorem 3)
(2) ∃κ ′, δ ′, T, s.t. [⊥,⊥] ⊥, δ / c
T
−→∗ κ ′, δ ′ / skip
By Soundness Theorem (Theorem 2)
(3) ⌊[⊥,⊥] ⊥, δ / c⌋i
⌊T⌋i
−→∗ ⌊κ, δ ′ / skip⌋i
By the operational semantic rules are deterministic and (3)
(4) Ti = ⌊T⌋i
By assumption and (1) and T-Conf
(5) ⊢ [⊥,⊥] ⊥, δ , c
By Preservation Theorem (Theorem 4), (5), and (2)
(6) ⊢ T
By Lemma 42 and (6)
(7) ⊢ ⌊T⌋1 ≈ℓA ⌊T⌋2
By (4) and (7), ⊢ T1 ≈ℓA T2

I GRADUAL GUARANTEES
I.1 Auxiliary Lemmas and Proofs
Lemma 44 (Operations are closed under refinement).
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1 if ι1 ⊑ ι
′
1 and ι2 ⊑ ι
′
2, then ι1 ⊲⊳ ι2 ⊑ ι
′
1 ⊲⊳ ι
′
2.
2 ι1 ⊑ ι
′
1 and ι2 ⊑ ι
′
2, then ι1 g ι2 ⊑ ι
′
1 g ι
′
2.
3 ι1 ⊑ ι
′
1 and ι2 ⊑ ι
′
2, then refine(ι1, ι2) ⊑ refine(ι
′
1, ι
′
2).
4 if ι1 ⊑ ι
′
1 and E ⊑ E
′, then ι1 ⊲⊳ E ⊑ ι
′
1 ⊲⊳ E
′.
5 д1 ⊑ д
′
1 and д2 ⊑ д
′
2, then д1 gc д2 ⊑ д
′
1 gc д
′
2.
Proof.
By assumptions
(1) ι1 = [ℓ1l , ℓ1r ], ι′1 = [ℓ
′
1l , ℓ
′
1r ], ℓ
′
1l 4 ℓ1l , and ℓ1r 4 ℓ
′
1r
(2) ι2 = [ℓ2l , ℓ2r ], ι′2 = [ℓ
′
2l , ℓ
′
2r ], ℓ
′
2l 4 ℓ2l , and ℓ2r 4 ℓ
′
2r
By (1) and (2)
(3) ℓ′1l uprise ℓ
′
2l 4 ℓ1l uprise ℓ2l and ℓ1r uprise ℓ2r 4 ℓ
′
1r uprise ℓ
′
2r
(4) ℓ′1l g ℓ
′
2l 4 ℓ1l g ℓ2l and ℓ1r g ℓ2r 4 ℓ
′
1r g ℓ
′
2r
By definition of ⊲⊳
(5) ι1 ⊲⊳ ι2 = [ℓ1l g ℓ2l , ℓ1r uprise ℓ2r ], and ι′1 ⊲⊳ ι
′
2 = [ℓ
′
1l g ℓ
′
2l , ℓ
′
1r uprise ℓ
′
2r ]
By (3) and (4), ι1 ⊲⊳ ι2 ⊑ ι′1 ⊲⊳ ι
′
2
By definition of g
(6) ι1 g ι2 = [ℓ1l g ℓ2l , ℓ1r g ℓ2r ] and ι′1 g ι
′
2 = [ℓ
′
1l g ℓ
′
2l , ℓ
′
1r g ℓ
′
2r ]
By (3), and (4) ι1 g ι2 ⊑ ι′1 g ι
′
2.
By definition of refine
(7) refine(ι1, ι2) = ([ℓ1l , ℓ1r uprise ℓ2r ], [ℓ2l g ℓ1l , ℓ2r ]), and
(8) refine(ι′1, ι
′
2) = ([ℓ
′
1l , ℓ
′
1r uprise ℓ
′
2r ], [ℓ
′
2l g ℓ
′
1l , ℓ
′
2r ])
T.S. [ℓ1l , ℓ1r uprise ℓ2r ] ⊑ [ℓ′1l , ℓ
′
1r uprise ℓ
′
2r ] and [ℓ2l g ℓ1l , ℓ2r ] ⊑ [ℓ
′
2l g ℓ
′
1l , ℓ
′
2r ]
By (1) and (3), [ℓ1l , ℓ1r uprise ℓ2r ] ⊑ [ℓ′1l , ℓ
′
1r uprise ℓ
′
2r ]
By (2) and (4), [ℓ2l g ℓ1l , ℓ2r ] ⊑ [ℓ′2l g ℓ
′
1l , ℓ
′
2r ]
By assumptions
(9) E = (ιa, ιb ), E ′ = (ι′a, ι
′
b
), and ιa ⊑ ι′a , ιb ⊑ ι
′
b
By ι1 ⊑ ι′1 and (9) and we have proven 1-3 of this lemma
(10) ιa ⊲⊳ ι1 ⊑ ι′a ⊲⊳ ι
′
1
By (10) and we have proven 1-3 of this lemma
(11) refine(ιa ⊲⊳ ι1, ιb ) ⊑ refine(ι′a ⊲⊳ ι
′
1, ι
′
b
)
By definition of ι ⊲⊳ E and (11), ι1 ⊲⊳ E ⊑ ι′1 ⊲⊳ E
′
The proof of 5 cases on д′1 and д
′
2. When neither one is ?, the conclusion holds because ⊑ is
reflexive. When one of them is ?, д′1 gc д
′
2 =?, it is defined that д1 gc д2 ⊑?. 
I.2 Static Gradual Guarantee
We omit the definitions of e ⊑ e ′ forWHILEG, which are inductively defined over the structure of
e . We only show the definition for cast expression below, as it requires the types to be the same.
e ⊑ e ′
e :: U ⊑ e ′ :: U
The precision of the cast operator is defined as shown above. As the precision operation is defined
over labels of values in stores, the expressions have to be cast to the same type U . If we cast e ′ to
a different typeU ′ and try to show thatU ⊑ U ′, the proof results in cases that require a proof for
ℓ1 ⊑ ℓ2 where ℓ1 , ℓ2, which does not hold.
Lemma 45. If д1 ⊑ д
′
1, д2 ⊑ д
′
2 and д1 4 c д2, then д
′
1 4 c д
′
2.
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Proof. Assume д1 = ℓ1 and д2 = ℓ2 (L.H.S of ⊑ is a precise label).
By precision definition, д′1 = ℓ1 or д
′
1 =?, and д
′
2 = ℓ2 or д
′
2 =?.
If д′1 = ℓ1 and д
′
2 = ℓ2, then the conclusion holds by assumption
If д′1 =? and д
′
2 = ℓ2, then ? 4 c ℓ2 holds by definition of 4 c
If д′1 = ℓ1 and д
′
2 =?, then ℓ1 4 c? holds by definition of 4 c
If д′1 =? and д
′
2 =?, then ? 4 c? holds by definition of 4 c 
Lemma 46 (Static Gradual Guarantee - Expressions). If Γ ⊢ e : U , Γ ⊑ Γ′, and e ⊑ e ′, then
Γ
′ ⊢ e ′ : U ′ andU ⊑ U ′.
Proof. By induction on the structure of the typing derivation. Follows from assumption for
Bool, Int, Var.
Case: Bop
By IH, τд1 ⊑ τд
′
1 and τд2 ⊑ τд
′
2
By Lemma 44, д1 gc д2 ⊑ д′1 gc д
′
2
By Bop, τд ⊑ τд
′
Case: Sub
Γ ⊢ e : τд1 U = τд д1 4 c д
Γ ⊢ e :: U : τд
T.S. Γ′ ⊢ e ′ :: U : τд and д′1 4 c д
′ where Γ′ ⊢ e ′ : τд
′
1
e ′ is also cast to U instead of another typeU ′ for reasons mentioned above.
By IH, Γ′ ⊢ e ′ : τд
′
1 , τд1 ⊑ τд
′
1 . Thus, д1 ⊑ д′1.
By assumption, д1 4 c д. д1 is a precise label (left-value of ⊑ is a precise label).
д1 = ℓ1, then д′1 = ℓ1 or д
′
1 =?. In both cases, д
′
1 4 c д.
By Sub, the conclusion holds.

Theorem 6 (Static Gradual Guarantee). If Γ;д ⊢ c , Γ ⊑ Γ′, д ⊑ д′, and c ⊑ c ′, then Γ′;д′ ⊢ c ′.
Proof. By induction on command typing derivation. Most cases can be proven by using the
induction hypothesis and the typing rule. When the derivation ends in Assign, Out, If, While,
apply Lemma 46 on the premises and when the derivation ends in If, While, we additionally apply
Lemma 44. We use the same typing rule to reach the conclusion. 
I.3 Dynamic Gradual Guarantee
Lemma 47 (Dynamic Guarantee (Expressions)). If δ1 / e1 ⇓ v1, δ1 ⊑ δ2, and e1 ⊑ e2, then
δ2 / e2 ⇓ v2 and v1 ⊑ v2.
Proof. By induction on the structure of the expression evaluation. We apply the induction
hypothesis directly for M-Ctx-Err. The basecases M-Const and M-Var can be shown using as-
sumptions directly.
Case: M-Bop
By assumption the evaluation ends in M-Bop rule:
(1)
δ / e1 ⇓ (ι1u1)
д1 δ / e2 ⇓ (ι2u2)
д2
ι = (ι1 g ι2) д = д1 gc д2 u = (u1 bop u2)
δ / e1 bop e2 ⇓ (ι u)
д
M-Bop
(2) e = e1 bop e2, δ ⊑ δ ′, and e ⊑ e ′
By inversion of (2)
(3) e ′ = e ′1 bop e
′
2, e1 ⊑ e
′
1, and e2 ⊑ e
′
2
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By I.H.
(4) δ ′ / e ′1 ⇓ (ι
′
1u
′
1)
д′1 , ι1 ⊑ ι′1, and д1 ⊑ д
′
1,
(5) δ ′ / e ′2 ⇓ (ι
′
2u
′
2)
д′2 , ι2 ⊑ ι′2, and д2 ⊑ д
′
2,
By M-Bop
(6) δ ′ / e ′1 bop e
′
2 ⇓ (ι
′ u)д
′
, where ι′ = ι′1 g ι
′
2, д
′
= д′1 gc д
′
2’
By Lemma 44
(7) (ι u)д ⊑ (ι′ u)д
′
Case: M-Cast and Pair-Cast can be proven similarly by applying I.H. and Lemma 44.

Lemma 48.
(1) if ι1 ⊑ ι2 and v1 ⊑ v2, and v
′
1 = refineLV (ι1, v1) and v
′
2 = refineLV (ι2, v2), then v
′
1 ⊑ v
′
2
(2) if ι1 ⊑ ι2 and v1 ⊑ v2, and v
′
1 = refineVL(v1, ι1) and v
′
2 = refineVL(v2, ι2), then v
′
1 ⊑ v
′
2
(3) if ι1 ⊑ ι2 and δ1 ⊑ δ2 , and δ
′
1 = rfL(δ1,X , ι1), and δ
′
2 = rfL(δ2,X , ι2), then δ
′
1 ⊑ δ
′
2
(4) if ι1 ⊑ ι2 and δ1 ⊑ δ2, ιpc1 ⊑ ιpc2 , ιc1 ⊑ ιc2 , д1 ⊑ д2, and δ
′
1 = refineWSet(δ1,X , ιpc1 , ιc1, (ι1 u)
д1 )
and δ ′2 = refineWSet(δ2,X , ιpc2 , ιc1, (ι2 u)
д2 ) then δ ′1 ⊑ δ
′
2.
Proof. Proofs of (1) and (2) examine the definitions of the operations and apply Lemma 44
directly. Proof of (3) is by induction over the size of X and (1). Proof of 4 invokes (3) directly. 
Theorem 7 (Dynamic Gradual Guarantee). If κ1, δ1 / c1
α1
−→ κ ′1, δ
′
1 / c
′
1 and κ1, δ1 / c1 ⊑
κ2, δ2 / c2, then κ2, δ2 / c2
α2
−→ κ ′2, δ
′
2 / c
′
2 such that κ
′
1, δ
′
1 / c
′
1 ⊑ κ
′
2, δ
′
2 / c
′
2 and α1 = α2.
Proof. By induction on the command semantics. Most cases can be proven by using the induc-
tion hypothesis and Lemma 44 directly.
When the derivation ends inM-Assign,M-Out, orM-If-Refine, apply Lemma 47 and Lemma48
on the premises and use the same semantic rule to reach the conclusion. 
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